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IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE IN CRIMINAL LAW
ROLLIN M. PERKINS t
Ignorance of law is no exctse, but mistake of fact is sufficient for
exculpation if what was done would have been lawful had the facts been
as they were reasonably supposed to be. This, like any other statement
which seeks to compress a large field of law into the confines of a
single sentence, is entirely too broad for certain specific situations. It
indicates the result of the ordinary case, but its scope and limitations
can be understood only in the light of important exceptions which have
been recognized. A study of these problems may well be prefaced by
brief reference to two words repeatedly encountered in this field.
It has been said that the words "ignorance" and "mistake" "do
not import the same significance and should not be confounded. Igno-
rance implies a total want of knowledge in reference to the subject
matter. Mistake admits a knowledge, but implies a wrong conclu-
sion." I For the most part, however, this distinction has not been
recognized. 2 Some courts have brushed it aside as "a refinement too
subtle to be applied to the every-day business of life",3 or one which
"rests on no solid foundation". 4  Most of them have merely ignored it.
Frequently these words have appeared in the phrases "ignorance
of law" 5 and "mistake of fact".6  At times the word "ignorance" 7
t A. B., igio, University of Kansas; J. D., 1912, Stanford University; S. J. D.,
1916, Harvard University; Professor of Law at University of Iowa; author of CASES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1929) ; IowA CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932) ; A Rationale
of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L. Ray. 905 (1939) ; contributor to other legal periodicals.
I. Hulton v. Edgerton, 6 S. C. 485, 489 (1875).
2. The most scholarly attempt to emphasize the distinction between the words
"ignorance" and "mistake" is that by Professor Keedy in his article Ignorance and
Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REV. 75 (19o8). This distinction is not here
insisted upon because the courts seem disinclined to recognize the approach from that
angle. But the difference between certain types of misunderstanding, which Professor
Keedy insisted upon, cannot be ignored.
3. Schlesinger v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 16, 25 (1863).
4. Champlin v. Laylin, 18 Wend. 407, 416 (N. Y. 1837).
5. United States v. One Buick Coach Automobile, 34 F. (2d) 318, 320 (N. D. Ind.
1929) ; Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 522, 530 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; Weeks
v. State, 24 Ala. App. I98, 199, 132 So. 870, 871 (1931) ; State v. Goodenow, 65 Me.
30, 33 (1876); Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 274 Mass. 315, 321, 174 N. E. 665, 667
(1931) ; State v. Welch, 73 Mo. 284, 285 (i88o) ; State v. Downs, I16 N. C. 1O64,
io66, 21 S. E. 689 (1895) ; Barronet's Case, I E. & B. I, 118 Eng. Rep. R. 337 (1852);
HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw (1881) 47.
6. Stern v. State, 53 Ga. 229, 231 (1874) ; State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 519, 126
N. W. 454, 456 (gio) ; Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 302, 303, 65 S. W. 920, 921
(i9O1) ; Welch v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 528, 53o, 8r S. W. 50, 51 (19o4) ; Chapman
v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 591, 595, 179 S. W. 570, 572 (915); Regina v. Tolson, 23
Q. B. D. 168, i9o (I889). Both frequently appear in the same sentence. See.People v.
Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 331, 193 N. E. 150, 153 (1934) ; Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 73,
12 S. W. (2d) 361, 363 (1928).
7. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 167 (1878).
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or the word "mistake" 8 has been applied to both types of error, whereas
elsewhere both words are coupled together in referring to each type.9
Whatever phraseology is employed it is necessary to explore to some
depths the exact nature and effect of the misunderstanding in a par-
ticular case. The field of possible error is too great for any one simple
solvent. It is important to inquire whether the ignorance or mistake
was of law or of fact, but it is also necessary to carry the investigation
far beyond this point.
I
IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF LAW
The Maxim
The maxim 10 "ignorantia legis neminem excusat" 11 ("ignorance
of the law excuses no man") 12 has appeared in many different forms.3
An occasional reference to it as a stern and inflexible rule of law with-
out any exception 14 is incorrect, 15 but beyond any doubt it determines
the result in all but very exceptional cases. Illustrative are the deci-
sions holding ignorance of the violated law no defense to a prosecution
for operating a gaming device, 16 betting on a horse race,17 conducting
a raffle,' 8 carrying concealed weapons, 19 accepting unlawful rebates
from carriers,20 altering public records, 21 illegal sale of liquor,
2 2 open-
ing a saloon on election day (though after the close of the election
itself),23 and obstructing a highway.
2 4
8. Hamilton v. State, 115 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 97, 29 S. W. (2d) 777, 778 (1930).
9. "His mistake or ignorance, if any, was one of law" and hence is no excuse.
State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29, 38 (1878).
ignorance or mistake, as to these facts, honest and real . . . absolves
from criminal responsibility." Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141, 144 (878).
IO. "A maxime is a proposition to be of all men confessed and granted without
proofe, argument, or discourse." Co. LITT. *67a. Needless to say there is no state-
ment of law which is excluded from the field of discussion and argument at the present
time.
ii. State v. Boyett, 32 N. C. 336, 343 (849).
12. Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21, 31 (1874).
13. See Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 522, 530 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937)
Weeks v. State, 24 Ala. App. 198, 199, 132 So. 870, 871 (1931) ; People v. O'Brien, 96
Cal. 171, 176, 13 Pac. 45, 47 (1892) ; People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 331, 193 N. E. 15o,
153 (1934) ; State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 519, 126 N. W. 454, 456 (igo) ; State v.
Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, 33 (1876) ; State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29, 38 (1878) ; State
v. Welch, 73 Mo. 284, 285 (i88o) ; State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 356, 179 At. I, 2
(1935) ; HoL: s, THE Colruio LAW (188) 47.
14. See Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57, 6o (1877).
15. See State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, 33 (1876) ; Cutler v. State, 36 N. J. L.
125, 127 (1873).
16. Atkins v. State, 95 Tenn. 474, 32 S. W. 391 (1895).
17. Debardelaben v. State, 99 Tenn. 649, 42 S. W. 684 (1897).
18. Hickman v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 16I, 141 S. W. 973 (1911).
19. Crain v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 55, 153 S. W. 155 (1913).
20. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56 (19o8).
21. People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 Pac. 45 (1892).
22. State v. McBrayer, 98 N. C. 619, 2 S. E. 755 (1887).
23. Jones v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 533, 25 S. W. 124 (894).
24. State v. Mainey, 65 Ind. 404 (1879).
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It applies to the most serious offenses as well as to those of a less
grievous nature. One, for example, who mistakenly believed he was
privileged by law to use deadly force if necessary to protect his prop-
erty was held guilty of criminal homicide for the fatal consequences of
his defensive effort. 5 It includes cases in which the misunderstanding
of the law relates to a clause other than the penal provision violated.
Thus mistake of law was no defense to a prosecution for practicing
medicine without a license, where the defendant who was familiar
with this law erroneously supposed his employment of a regularly
licensed physician to work under his direction in his "cancer sanitarium"
would satisfy the requirements of the license law. 20 Furthermore, the
mistaken notion that a "divorce" granted to one of the defendants was
valid and permitted them to inter-marry did not save them from con-
viction under the "Blanket Act"; 27 and an officer's erroneous belief
that he was entitled to the fees of his office did not excuse him from
the statutory crime of embezzlement by a public officer. 28 The maxim
applies although the mistaken belief is held by many other than the
defendant; 29 and even a foreigner who violates the law by a deed not
recognized as a crime in his own country is not excused although he
may never have heard of such a law.3 0
Knowledge of Law Presumed
"Every person is presumed to know the law", 31 is one of the
familiar phrases in this field. On rare occasions this presumption has
beer challenged. "There is no presumption in this country that every
person knows the law: it would be contrary to common sense and
reason if it were so", said Mr. Justice Maule in an English case.32  He
did not recognize ignorance of law as an excuse but questioned the pro-
priety of stating the rule in terms of a presumption. Such criticism,
however, is based upon a misunderstanding of the word "presump-
25. Weston v. Commonwealth, iii Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 19I (1885). For a similar
result under slightly different facts see People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236 (i878).
26. Needham v. State, 55 Okla. Cr. R. 430, 32 P. (2d) 92 (1934).
27. State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 179 Atl. i (1935). The court emphasized that
all the facts were known and the only misunderstanding was one of law. Cf. State v.
Audette, 81 Vt. 400, 7o Atl. 833 (1908).
28. Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S. W. (2d) 361 (1928). The specific intent
required for ordinary embezzlement was not an element of this special statutory offense.
Such a mistake would be an excuse if it negatived the existence of a required specific
intent. See infra p. 45.
29. State v. Southern Ry., 122 N. C. 1052, 30 S. E. 133 (1898).
30. Rex v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 203 (1836) ; Barronet's Case, i
E. & B. 5, 118 Eng. Rep. R. 337 (1852). This, however, may be considered on an
application for executive clemency. Ibid.
3r. Weeks v. State, 24 Ala. App. I98, i99, 132 So. 87o, 871 (1931). See also Blum-
enthal v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 522, 530 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; People v. Cohn, 358
Ill. 326, 331, 193 N. E. 150, 153 (I934) ; Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21, 31 (1874) ; 4
BL. CoMM. 27; I HA.E, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42.
32. Martindale v. Faulkner, 2 C. B. 7o6, 719, 135 Eng. Rep. R. 1124, 1129 (1846).
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tion". One of the three senses in which the term is used is to signify
an inference of fact, but this "should be discarded as useless and con-
fusing",3 3 and is not at all the sense in which it is employed in the
phrase under consideration.3 4 A true presumption is a rule of evidence
which calls for a certain result in a particular case unless the party
adversely affected comes forward with evidence to overcome it.3 5 This
is sometimes referred to as a "prima fade presumption" to distinguish
it from the so-called "conclusive presumption" which is a legal device
in the form of a postulate used for the determination of a particular
case whether it corresponds with the actual facts or not, as, for example,
the conclusive presumption of delivery by all the prior parties to a
negotiable instrument which has reached the hands of a holder in due
course.
36
The latter use of the word "presumption", while not entirely free
from objection,37 cannot be here ignored because this is the sense in
which it has been commonly employed at this point in the criminal
law.33 This meaning is emphasized by such familiar expressions as
that every person "is bound to know the law" 39 or is "charged with
knowledge of the law" 40 or "must know what the law is and act at
his peril." 41 To say that everyone is conclusivly presumed to know
the law is merely another form of saying that ignorance of the law is
no excuse. There is also, however, a true presumption of knowledge of
the law. Ordinarily this lies dormant because the case is not to be
burdened with evidence which cannot affect the result. But in those
exceptional situations in which ignorance of the law is an excuse, the
case will still be decided as if the law had been known unless the de-
fendant comes forward with evidence to show that he did not know.
42
Stated differently, knowledge of the law is presumed; in most cases
33. 5 WIGMORE, EV'MENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2491.
34. "It is not so much a presumption of fact, as a fact, as it is a conclusion or pre-
sumption of the law.... ".Commonwealth v. Jellico Coal Co., 96 Ky. 373, 375, 29
S. W. 26 (1895).
35. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2491.
36. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTs LAW, § i6.
37. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2492.
38. ". . . everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law ... " State v.
Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 356, 179 Atl. I (I935). A study of other cases will show that this
is ordinarily the intended meaning whether or not the word "conclusively" is added.
39. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42; State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 519, 126 N.
W. 454, 456 (igio) ; State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, 33 (1876).
4o. Menefee v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 375, 87 S. W. (2d) 478 (1935).
41. Needham v. State, 55 Okla. Cr. R. 43o, 434, 32 P. (2d) 92, 93 (1934).
42. "Assuming, without deciding, that the presumption was a rebuttable one it is
to be observed that the defendants introduced no evidence in the attempt to rebut the
presumption." Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 522, 53 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
Probably there are rare cases in which there is no presumpt n of knowledge of law
either conclusive or disputable, as where the deed was prohibited by a law held uncon-
stitutional by a prior decision which has been overruled aft the deed was committed.
See infra p. 44.
/
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this presumption is conclusive but under exceptional circumstances it
is disputable.
The Intent to Commit Crime
For reasons of policy, presently to be considered, a knowledge of
the law is postulated; and except in unusual situations, also to be men-
tioned, this postulate may not be questioned. In this light it is possible
to consider such cases in terms of mens rea. One who, knowing the
law, by intention or criminal negligence brings about the result which
the law was intended to prevent has unquestionably a socially blame-
worthy state of mind (in the absence of exculpating circumstances, such
as compulsion) .43 If no additional mental element is required for con-
viction of the particular crime his state of mind meets the requirements
of mens rea and he is guilty. Furthermore, this result is reached for
the purposes of a particular case if this knowledge is established by a
presumption as fully as if it h~d been proved by the introduction of
evidence.
4 4
The application of the mens rea concept may well be considered
fiom another point of view. "In law, the commission of a crime con-
sists in the joint operation of act and intent or criminal negligence." 45
Such a statement fails to give full scope to the psychical element of
criminality which falls outside of the field of actual intent,46 but atten-
tion may be limited for the moment to intent alone. As a matter of
law, an intent to do a certain deed, under circumstances which would
amount to a crime if the intended result is achieved, is an intent to com-
nit that very crime. If, for example, one person attacked another with
intent to kill him, without justification or excuse, but in the sudden
heat of passion engendered by such provocation that the crime would
be manslaughter if death resulted, he has committed an assault with
intent to commit manslaughter if the results were not fatal.47  It is not
43. Compulsion might constitute an exculpating circumstance if the social harm
was not too great. Rex v. Crutchley, 5 C. & P. 133, 172 Eng. Rep. R. o9 (183i). It
is unnecessary to attempt here to consider in detail the various "excuses" such as insan-
ity or even mistake of fact.
44. "He must be presumed to have known the provisions of s. 7, whether he was
actually acquainted with its terms or not. Then he knew that he had not the written
consent of the mortgagee; and that knowledge was sufficient to make him aware that
he was offending against the provisions of the Act, or, in other words, was sufficient
to constitute what is known in law as niens rea." Bank of New South Wales v. Piper,
11897] A. C. 383, 390. See also Yoder v. State, 208 Ind. 50, 57, 194 N. E. 645 (1935);
State v. Boyett, 32 N. C. 336, 344 (849).
45. Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126, 128 (1873). See also Hoover v. State, 5b Ala.
57, 6o (1877) ; State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175, I80, 53 Pac. 978 (1898).
46. In malice aforethought, for example, the law takes notice of an attitude of mind
in the nature of a wanton and reckless disregard of human life which falls between an
intent to kill and criminal negligence.
47. Feagle v. State, 55 Fla. 13, 46 So. 182 (19o8) ; Robinson v. State, 152 Ind.
304, 53 N. E. 223 (898) ; State v. McGuire, 87 Iowa 142, 54 N. W. 202 (1893) ; State
v. Murray, 83 Kan. 148, I1o Pac. lO3 (i91o) ; State v. Calligan, 17 N. H. 253 (1845).
These cases are based upon statute. There was no offense known as assault with intent
to commit manslaughter at common law.
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an assault with intent to commit murder even if he supposed such a
killing would be murder; nor would his notion that such a homicide is
excusable change the result in the other direction. The law applies
its own labels to intents as well as to results.
"It is very true", said the Alabama court, "that to constitute a
crime there must be both an act and an intent. But, in such a case as
this, it is enough if the act be knowingly and intentionally committed.
The law makes the act an offence, and does not go farther and require
proof that the offenders intended by the prohibited act, to violate the
law." 48 The same idea has been repeated in different forms.49  The
intent to commit crime "is not the intent to violate the law but the-inten-
tional doing the act which is a violation of law". 50 It is an intent
to do what the law calls a crime, whatever the actor himself may call
it. A word of caution, however, may well be added at this point. If
for guilt of a particular offense, some special mental element is required,
such as that the prohibited deed be done "corruptly", the law itself
does not apply the label "crime" to such a deed in the absence of the
required mental element. Hence the innocent intent to perform such a
deed in the bona fide belief of its propriety is not an intent to commit
crime. 51
Reason for the Maxim
While the "ignorance of law is no excuse" maxim may be rational-
ized with the mens rea concept, it should be frankly recognized that the
former is in the nature of an exception to the basic principles upon
which the latter is grounded. Mere logic would seem to indicate that
the maxim should be abrogated entirely. But logic is the servant of
the law, not its master; and iogical abstractions must give way in the
presence of overbalancing considerations. This invites attention to the
considerations upon which the maxim is supported.
These considerations are matters of "public policy" 52 or "public
necessity".53 "The welfare of society and the safety of the state" 54
have been felt to require this maxim "in order practically to administer
48. Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57, 6o (1877). See also People v. Dillon, 199 Cal. I,
248 Pac. 23o (1926) ; Kennedy v. State, 46 Ga. App. 42, 166 S. E 442 (1932).
49. See Weeks v. State, 24 Ala. App. 198, 199, 132 So. 870, 871 (1931) ; People v.
Whitney, 57 Cal. App. 449, 452, 207 Pac. 698, 699 (1922).
5o. State v. Downs, 116 N. C. lO64, io66, 21 S. E. 689 (1895). The same court
said: "Knowledge that he was carrying the weapon concealed is equivalent, under the
statute, to the criminal intent to conceal which is required by law to exist, there being
no lawful excuse for carrying it." State v. Simmons, 143 N. C. 613, 617, 56 S. E. 701,
703 (9o7).
51. See infra p. 48.
52. State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 519, 126 N. W. 454, 456 (191o).
53. People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 Pac. 45, 47 (1892).
54. Ibid. "Without it the court would be powerless to maintain any effective and
valuable administration of the Criminal Code." Commonwealth v. Jellico Coal Co., 96
Ky. 373, 376, 29 S. W. 26 (1895).
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justice among men." 5- "If a person accused of crime", said the Cali-
fornia court, "could shield himself behind the defense that he was
ignorant of the law which he violated, immunity from punishment
would in most cases result. . . . The plea would be universally made,
and would lead to interminable questions incapable of solution." 51 If
the social harm in a particular case is slight and the ignorance of the
law on the part of the offender is fairly obvious, the state may wisely
refrain from prosecution in his case. In certain other cases igno-
rance of law may be considered by the court in mitigation of punish-
ment,57 or may be made the basis of an application for executive clem-
ency. 58  But if such ignorance were available as a defense in every
criminal case, this would be a constant source of confusion to juries,
and it would tend to encourage ignorance at a point where it is pecul-
iarly important to the state that knowledge should be as widespread as
is reasonably possible. 59 In the language of one of the giants of the
profession, this is a point at which "justice to the individual is rightly
outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales." 10
Exceptions
The possibility of exceptions must be studied in the light of the
considerations underlying the maxim. As it is founded upon matters
of policy deemed sufficient to require results other than would be
reached by logic, the first search for limitations should be at points
where the foundations of the maxim fail to give support while other
considerations of policy point definitely in a different direction. Since
this search will reveal certain important exceptions it is necessary to
qualify the ordinary statement of mens rea in this field by recognizing
ignorance of law in these'unusual situations as a special circumstance of
exculpation. 6  At some points the policy which calls for exemption
from guilt on this ground is so strong that ignorance of law may con-
stitute a defense even in prosecutions for the so-called "public torts" 62
55. Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21, 31 (1874).
56. People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. I7I, 176, 31 Pac. 45, 47 (892).
57. Re Russell, [i9ol] A. C. 446; People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 Pac. 45
(1892) ; State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 3o (1876).
58. Rex v. Bailey, Russ. & Ry., I, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 651 (i8oo) ; Barronet's Case,
I E. & B. I, 11S Eng. Rep. R. 337 (Q. B. 1852).
59. "One who is bound to obey the law ought not to be allowed to say that he was
ignorant of it." State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 519, 126 N. W. 454, 456 (191o).
6o. HOLMES, THE Co0,.loN LAW (1881) 48.
61. The statement may be in some such form' as this: an intent to do a deed
which is a crime is in juridical contemplation an intent to commit that crime even if
the actor believes the law to be otherwise, unless the ignorance of law is in such an
exceptional situation as to constitute a special circumstance of exculpation.
6z. See BEALE, CASES ON CRIMIINAL LAW (4th ed. 1928) 129. Often they are
called offenses nahm prohibitun as distinguished from, offenses mahon in Se. See
People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 52, 24 P. (2d) 965, 970 (1933).
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or "civil offenses" 63 for which the normal requirement of ncus rea
is wanting. 64  And here will be found cases in which the result--dia-
metrically opposed to the general statement-is that ignorance of the
law will excuse while reasonable mistake of fact will not.
6 5
Reliance upon Legal Advice
Ignorance of law will not excuse him who violates it even if he
had been told in advance that such conduct would be lawful. 66 This is
held to be the result even if the erroneous legal advice was received from
a reputable attorney, 67 on the ground that a contrary result "would
be placing the advice of counsel above the law itself." 68 To the extent,
however, that some exception is recognized on other grounds, advice
of counsel is admissible if it tends to establish ignorance of law on the
part of the defendant. 69
The arguments used to support the position taken with reference
to advice of counsel seem peculiarly unconvincing. Ignorance of law
based upon advice of a reputable attorney would not present to the
jury "questions incapable of solution". Insistence, as in cases of recog-
nized exceptions to the maxim, that the thing done must not be ob-
viously anti-social in character and that the belief in the legality of
the conduct must be in good faith, would seem to be adequate safe-
guards. It would not be surprising if some courageous court should
lead the way for a new development along this line by including a
proper case of this nature among the exceptions to the maxim.
At some extreme points exceptions have already been made to the
rule that reliance upon legal advice is no excuse. If the offense charged
is the violation of a law which forbids the doing of certain things with-
out securing a permit from a specified commission or department, the
bona fide reliance upon advice received from that very commission
or department to the effect that contemplated action falls without the
63. This phrase is used for the same purpose by Professor Gausewitz. Legis.,
Criminal Law-Reclassification of Certain Offenses as Civil Instead of Criminal (1937)
12 Wis. L. REV. 365.
64. That mens rea is not required for convictions of such offenses unless added by
the terms of a particular statute, see Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (933) 33 CoL. L.
REV. 55.
65. Compare McKnight v. State, 171 Tenn. 574, io6 S. W. (2d) 556 (1937), with
People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P. (2d) 965 (1933).
66. State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30 (1876) (advice by magistrate) ; State v. Sim-
mons, 143 N. C. 613, 56 S. E. 70, (1907) (advice by court clerk).
67. State v. Hughes, 58 Iowa 165, II N. W. 7o6 CiS82) ; State v. Armington, 25
Minn. 29 (1878) ; Weston v. Commonwealth, iii Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 191 (1885); Hunter
v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S. W. (2d) 361 (1928).
68. Needham v. State, 55 Okla. Cr. R. 430, 434, 32 P. (2d) 92, 93 (934). "If
ignorance of counsel would excuse violations of the criminal law, the more ignorant
counsel could manage to be the more valuable and sought after, in many cases, would
be his advice." State v. Downs, 116 N. C. lO64, io66, 21 S. E. 689 (1895).
69. State v. McKinney, 42 Iowa 205 (1875) ; Commonwealth v. Bradford, 9 Mete.
268 (Mass. 1845) ; see Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 453 (1907).
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scope of the statute and hence requires no permit, has been held to bar
a conviction." ° And one who made a full disclosure of the facts to the
registration officers, or the judges of election, and was advised by them
that he had a lawful right to vote, was held not guilty of unlawful reg-
istration as a voter,71 or illegal voting,72 although the advice he received
was erroneous. Such decisions are unquestionably sound. Confidence
in the government itself would be seriously undermined if citizens
should be punished for apparently innocent deeds done in bona fide reli-
ance upon the advice of officers who are authorized by the state to give
such advice.
Reliance upon Statute or Decision
A statute which is unconstitutional ig void; it is not a part of the
law of the state.73 But it would be utterly unfair to the individual and
very detrimental to the general social welfare to require each one to
determine for himself, at his peril, to what extent if at all the legisla-
ture has overstepped its constitutional limitations.7 4  Hence the citizen
is directed, in effect, to regulate his conduct according to the provi-
sions of the statutory law, unless and until some part of it has been
found to be invalid by judicial determination,7 5 or has been repealed
by the legislative body. Prior to that time his mistaken belief in the
unconstitutionality of the statute will give him no more protection than
any other ignorance of law on his part; 76 whereas his belief in the
validity of the enactment will excuse him from criminal consequences
of any conduct which would have been proper had his- assumption been
correct, even if the statute is subsequently held to be unconstitutional
and void.
77
For a similar reason the citizen is not permitted, except at his
peril, to oppose his own belief to the judicial determination of the court
7o. People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P. (2d) 965 (1933). A third of a
century earlier another court had reached a contrary result under very similar facts.
State v. Foster, 22 R. I. 163, 4o Atl. 833 (19oo). That decision however is an echo of
the ancient notion that the ignorance of law maxim "has no exceptions". The later
case is much more in line with the modern development.
71. State v. White, 237 Mo. 2o8, 14o S. W. 896 (1911).
72. State v. Pearson, 97 N. C. 434, I S. E. 914 (1887).
73. "When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never
been." I COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 382.
74. "To require the citizen to determine for himself, at his peril, to what extent,
if at all, the legislature has overstepped the boundaries defined by the constitution in
passing this mass of statutes would be to place upon him an intolerable burden, one
which it would be absolutely impossible for him to bear-a duty infinitely beyond his
ability to perform." Lang v. Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 46o, 68 Atl. go, 92 (19o6).
75. Claybrook v. State, 164 Tenn. 44o,_5i S. W. (2d) 499 (1932).
76. Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S. W. (2d) 361 (1928) ; see State v. Sugar-
man, 126 Minn. 477, 483, 148 N. W. 466, 468 (1914). A religious belief that the
bigamy law should not have been enacted is no excuse for a violation of the law.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 167 (1878) ; Long v. State, 192 Ind. 524, 137
N. E. 49 (1922).
77. Claybrook v. State, 164 Tenn. 44o, 5I S. W. (2d) 499 (1932).
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of last resort. His claim of a belief in the unconstitutionality of a
statute which had previously been upheld by such a court would be even
weaker than the ordinary plea of ignorance of law; 78 whereas if the
court of last resort has held the statute to be unconstitutional, no con-
duct (which would be socially acceptable in the absence of such legisla-
tion) in reliance upon such decision and before it is overruled, will merit
punishment even if that court subsequently overrules the first decision
and declares the statute to be constitutional and valid.79
It has also been held that a similar excuse will be recognized where
a mistaken belief as to the law was based upon a decision of a lower
court, prior to the contrary determination of a higher court.80 In spite
of an indication to the contrary,"' this view is sound and it is to be
expected that the development of the law will be definitely in that direc-
tion. The two pillars which support the maxim with its occasional
harsh results are that recognition of ignorance of law as a defense
would (i) present to the jury "questions incapable of solution" 82 and
(2) encourage ignorance where knowledge is socially desirable.8 3 Both
of these pillars are swept away where ignorance of law was due to
reliance upon the decision of a court of record which was at the time of
the reliance the last word in the jurisdiction upon that point. The evi-
dence in such a case will be unusually clear cut 84 and the average citi-
zen should not be bound to know more law than a court of record.
Similar problems may arise in cases where there has been reliance
upon judicial interpretation of statutes, which are subsequently given
a different construction. These problems should be solved in the same
general manner. Prior to judicial determination, however, where the
question is not the validity of a statute but its proper interpretation, a
problem of a very different nature may be presented. It is one thing
to require the citizen to regulate his conduct according to the provi-
78. For example, ignorance of law may be an excuse if the prosecution is for an
offense which requires a specific intent and such ignorance negatives this intent. See
infra p. 45. But one who knew of a statute and the decision of the highest court uphold-
ing it would probably not be heard, even in such a case, to say that he was ignorant of
the law because he believed the decision was erroneous.
A conviction of fraudulently appropriating money of a trust fund, in violation of a
court order was affirmed although the defendant believed the court had made a mistake
in the order. Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 274 Mass. 315, 174 N. E. 665 (1931).
79. State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (I91O) ; see Hunter v. State,
158 Tenn. 63, 73, 12 S. W. (2d) 361, 364 (1928); cf. Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57
(1877). The nature of the offense in the Alabama case, miscegenation, may have been
regarded by the court as highly improper even in the absence of statute.
So. State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934).
81. State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 210 N. W. 137 (1927).
82. People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 Pac. 45, 47 (1892).
83. HOLmES, THE CoMmoN LAW (i88i) 48.
84. Any possible difficulties of proof as to whether the citizen acted in reliance
upon the decision should be solved by a presumption of such reliance-perhaps even the
so-called "conclusive presumption". See State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 523, 126 N. W.
454, 457 (191o).
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sions of a statute, the meaning of which is clear 11 or has been judicially
determined; it is quite a different matter to require each person to pre-
dict, at his peril, the exact meaning which will .be assigned by the court
to an enactment which is ambiguous or obscure. If the meaning of a
statute is not clear, and has not been judicially determined, one who has
acted "in good faith" should not be held guilty of crime if his conduct
would have been proper had the statute meant what he "reasonably
believed" it to mean, even if the court should decide later that the
proper construction is otherwise. s 6
Specific Intent
More common, factually, than exceptions of the types heretofore
mentioned, are those recognized in cases in which some special mental
element, required for conviction of the particular offense, is found to be
wanting because of ignorance of the law. Thus, the maxim is held
not to apply where "specific intent is essential to a crime, and ignorance
of law negatives the existence of such intent".8 7  This exception has
been quite generally recognized in prosecutions for larceny and the
associated offenses of robbery and embezzlement. The actus reus of
the crime of larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of the
personal property of another. This may be done intentionally without
committing larceny, as where a chattel is wrongfully taken for a tem-
porary use with the intent to return it to the owner. a8 In other words
the mental element required for guilt of larceny is not merely the intent
to do the actus reus, but the intent to steal-the anims furandi.8 9 The
same mental element is required for robbery. An intent to take a chat-
tel which the taker bona fide believes is his property which is being held
wrongfully by another, does not constitute animus furandi, however
erroneous the belief may be. 91 Hence one who takes and carries away
the chattel of another ufider such a bona fide belief is not guilty of
85. "The law, which the respondents are conclusively presumed to have known, as
applicable to their case, is well settled and free from all obscurity or doubt." State v.
Goodenow, 65 Me. 3o (1876).
86. Cutter v. State, 36 N. J. L. 125 (1873) ; Burns v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. R. 611,
61 S. W. (2d) 512 (1933). For the quotations in the text see id. at 615, 61 S. W. (2d)
at 514.
87. United States v. One Buick Coach Automobile, 34 F. (2d) 318 (N. D. Ind.
1929).
88 ... if the property were taken with the intention of only using it tem-
porarily and then returning it to the owner, it is not larceny. . . ." State v. Davis,
38 N. J. L. 176 (1875). See also Rex v. Crump, i C. & P. 658, 171 Eng. Rep. R. 1357
(1825).
89. State v. Ryan, 12 Nev. 4o1 (1877).
go. "To constitute robbery the taking must in all cases be accompanied with a felo-
nious intent, or aninus furandi." Johnson v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. R. 326, 330, 218 Pac.
179, 181 (1923).
gi. Rex v. Knight, 2 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *510; Morningstar v. State, 55
Ala. 148 (1876) ; Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126 (1873).
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larceny, even if his error was due to ignorance of law.9 2  For the same
reason, such a taking, accomplished by means of force or menaces, is
not robbery; 93 and an attempt to take by such means and under such
belief does not constitute an assault with intent to commit robbery.
94
The taker's ignorance of law does not excuse his deed. He is answer-
able for trespass in either of the first two cases, 95 although this of
itself is not a crime; 911 and he would be guilty of assault in the second
and third.9 7  But in each case he is saved from conviction of the
offense charged for the simple reason that one of the elements re-
quired for guilt has been disproved. Needless to say guilt would be
established even in such a case if defendant's knowledge of law was
conclusively presumed, but this is one of the recognized exceptions and
the presumption is not conclusive at this point.
The crime of embezzlement, created by statute in England to fill
certain gaps in the law of larceny, 98 also includes a specific intent.99
This intent, while perhaps not strictly an intent to steal, is an intent to
deprive the owner of his property and is for practical purposes the
counterpart of the animus furandi required for larceny.10 0 Hence the
unauthorized retention of the property of another under a bona fide
claim of right is not embezzlement even if the error is one of law.' 0 '
Certain offenses are not committed unless the prohibited deed is
done fraudulently. Without attempting to exhaust the list it may be
mentioned that this is true of such common law offenses as forgery
92. Morningstar v. State, 55 Ala. 148 (1876) ; State v. Sawyer, 95 Conn. 34, 110
At. 461 (192o) ; People v. Schultz, 71 Mich. 315, 38 N. W. 868 (1888) ; see Territory
v. Dowdy, 14 Ariz. 145, 147, 124 Pac. 894, 895 (912). One may be properly con-
victed of larceny of goods although he claims to own them if the claim is not made in
good faith. Bridgeman v. State, 145 Ark. 554, 225 S. W. 1 (1920) ; Morrisette v. State,
77 Ala. 71 (1884) ; State v. Carroll, i6o Mo. 368, 6o S. W. 1087 (1900).
93. Rex v. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409, 172 Eng. Rep. R. 477 (1828) ; Brown v. State, 28
Ark. 126 (1873) ; State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200 (1875) ; Johnson v. State, 24 Okla.
Cr. R. 326, 218 Pac. 179 (1923) ; People v. Hughes, l Utah 100, 39 Pac. 492 (1895).
94. Barton v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 368, 227 S. W. 317 (1922).
95. Morrisette v. State, 77 Ala. 71, 74 (1884) ; State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200,
202 (875) ; cf. State v. Sawyer, 95 Conn. 34, 11o Atd. 461 (1920).
96. The word "trespass" is sometimes used in the older writings to mean misde-
meanor in distinction from felony. I BIsHOP, NEW CmmiMNA LAw (8th ed. 1892)
§ 625. Such a taking would not be a "trespass" in this sense, but the better usage lim-
its the word "trespass" to the civil wrong except in certain instances such as malicious
trespass to real estate.
97. Defendant took two bales of cotton from another at the point of a gun. He
did this in the presence of a crowd of persons, including a peace officer, under a claim
of title. In reversing a conviction of robbery the court said defendant's conduct "was
quite reprehensible and merited punishment." Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126, 129 (1873).
98. See KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (15th ed. 1929), c. 14.
99. Certain types of embezzlement statutes do not require any intent other than to
do the prohibited deed itself. See, for example, Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S. W.
(2d) 361 (1928).
IOO. See 2 BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 96, §§ 379, 471.
1O. Lindgren v. United States, 260 Fed. 772 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919); People v.
Lapique, 120 Cal. 25, 52 Pac. 40 (1898); Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 21, 37 So. 576
(1904) ; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 731, 75 S. W. 244 (1903).
IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE IN CRIMINAL LAW
and uttering a forged instrument, 02 and of certain statutory offenses
such as some of those included in the penal provisions of the bank-
ruptcy act, 103 and fraudulent conveyances in states in which these have
been made crimes. 10 4 As fraudulently means an "intent to defraud",
there is here a requirement of a special attitude of mind in the nature
of an "intent" in the true sense of the word. And a mistake of law
may be of such a nature as to indicate that a certain deed was not done
fraudulently, although this element would have been present had the
same thing been done without such a mistake. Even one who obtains
money or chattels from another by wilful misrepresentations is not
guilty of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses if he hon-
estly believes he is entitled to exactly what he gets, although a misun-
derstanding of the law may be the basis of his erroneous notion.
10 5
Such a one is not entirely above reproach because he intentionally makes
false statements to influence the action of another. But his conduct is
not fraudulent because he seeks only to have that done which he sin-
cerely believes should be done. In a different type of offense his mis-
take of law might result in conduct, actually improper, but performed
in the utmost good faith in every sense of the word. It would be an
obvious contradiction in terms to speak of such conduct as "fraudulent".
Special Mental Element Other than Intent
A special mental element required for guilt of some particular
offense may be other than an intent in the true sense of the word. Com-
mon illustrations involve offenses in which the additional requirement
is that the deed be done (i) maliciously, (2) corruptly, (3) wilfully
or (4) knowingly. And in certain cases ignorance of law may negative
-the existence of such an elem-ent.
Maliciously. A bona fide belief in the lawfulness of what was
done, althotugh erroneous, was held to be a defense to a prosecution for
maliciously setting fire to a furze, 08 maliciously removing rails from a
fence,' 07 maliciously tearing down a fence,' 08 maliciously removing
scales and a partition from a building, 0 9 and maliciously removing
crops from the field of another."10 As previously mentioned, mistake
1o2. Regina v. Parish, 8 C. & P. 94, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 413 (837).
1O3. NATI ONAL BAN R RCY AcT, §29 (a) and (b), 30 STAT. 554 (x898), ii U. S.
C. A. § 52 (1927).
io4. See, for example, Mo. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed. 1932) c. 30, § 4098.
iO5. Rand v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 343, 353, 195 S. W. 802, 8o8 (917).
io6. Regina v. Twoze, I4 Cox C. C. 327 (I879).
io7. Goforth v. State, 8 Humph. 37 (Tenn. 1847).
io8. Palmer v. State, 45 Ind. 388 (1873).
iog. State v. Newkirk, 49 Mo. 84 (1871).
110. State v. Luther, 8 R. I. 151 (I865). The statute in this case did not use the
word "maliciously" or any other word of like import, but the court held that it must
be implied.
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of law will not excuse homicide, but the possibility of its being suffi-
cient under some circumstances to negative the existence of malice afore-
thought (so that the slaying will be manslaughter only) should be
recognized. If the court does not take this position the jury will prob-
ably reach the same result by applying its own common sense,' but
it would be wiser as well as more sound to state the law in these terms:
while mistake of law will not excuse homicide it may in a particular
case be such a mitigating circumstance as to reduce the grade of the
offense to manslaughter.
Corruptly. For conviction of certain offenses there is a specific
requirement that the prohibited deed be done corruptly, and this ad-
verb may not properly be applied to what is done with a bona fide belief
of propriety, even if such belief is induced by ignorance of law. Per-
jury, for example, is not merely swearing to that which is really not
the fact, but doing this wilfully and corruptly."- Hence one who
testified that no partnership existed between himself and another, was
held not to be guilty of perjury although a legal relation of this nature
actually existed, if he gave his testimony in good faith reliance upon
the advice of counsel that the dealings between the two did not as a
matter of law create a partnership."i 3 Conviction of perjury was re-
versed in another case because the defendant was not permitted to ex-
plain his misstatement in the light of his erroneous understanding of
the legal title to certain property and the extent of the exemption of
the homestead law." 4
Another illustration is in the field of extortion. To be guilty of
this offense at common law the officer must have "wilfully and cor-
ruptly demanded and received other or greater fees than the law al-
lows." 115 And this additional mental element has frequently been held
to be implied in statutes which do not include the word "corruptly"."1
6
Where this element has been overlooked (by the legislature or the
court) it has been held no defense to a charge of extortion that the
officer honestly believed he was entitled to the fee which he charged; 117
but where this very sound requirement has been recognized, a misunder-
iii. In People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236 (1878); and Weston v. Commonwealth, iii
Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 191 (I885), the courts did not suggest that a bona fide belief, resulting
from a mistake of law as to the right to use deadly force to prevent crime or to defend
property, would negative malice aforethought, but although the charges were murder,
the verdicts were guilty of manslaughter.
112. Rex v. Smith, 2 Shower K. B. r65, 89 Eng. Rep. R. 864 (1681).
113. State v. McKinney, 42 Iowa 205 (1875).
114. State v. Lazarus, 181 Iowa 625, 164 N. W. 1037 (1917).
115. Runnells v. Fletcher, 15 Mass. 525 (1819).
116. Leeman v. State, 35 Ark. 438 (188o) ; State v. Pritchard, 107 N. C. 921, 12
S. E. 50 (i8go).
117. Levar v. State, w03 Ga. 42, 29 S. E. 467 (1897) ; Commonwealth v. Bagley,
7 Pick. 279 (Mass. 1828) ; People v. Monk, 8 Utah 35, 28 Pac. 1115 (1892).
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standing of the law which induced a bona fide belief in the lawfulness
of the charge made, has been held to establish innocence.", 8
If an officer, under color of his office, illegally and corruptly in-
flicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or injury other
than extortion he is guilty of the offense of oppression. 119  Because of.
the special requirement of corruptness a magistrate who commits a
person under a bona fide mistake of law is not guilty of a crime. 120 As
it was said by an English court, "When magistrates act uprightly and
honestly, even though they mistake the law, no information ought to be
granted against them." 121
Misconduct in office is not a crime unless the violation or neglect
of duty is wilful, corrupt or fraudulent; 122 hence an honest belief of
propriety though based upon a mistake of law, has been held to bar a
conviction of wilfully and corruptly granting a tavern license, 12 3 or
neglecting an official duty.
124
Wilfully. "The word 'willful' . . is elastic and is of somewhat
varied signification according to the context in which it is found and
the nature of the subject matter to which it refers." 125 At times it may
mean no more than a willingness to do the particular deed,'12 but in
certain connections it has been held to mean "not merely 'voluntarily',
but with a bad purpose." 127 Its import in one case was given as "cor-
ruptly, with fraudulent intent, designedly and with improper mo-
tives." 128 Of particular interest in the present discussion is the re-
quirement often imposed because of the use of the word "wilful", that
the act be done, not only with an evil intent, but also "without reason-
able grounds for believing the act to be lawful".
1 29
118. United States v. Highleyman, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,361 (W. D. Mo.'I876);
Cleaveland v. State, 34 Ala. 254 (1859) ; Leeman v. State, 35 Ark. 438 (188o) ; Cutter
v. State, 36 N. J. L. 125 (Sup. Ct. 1873) ; State v. Pritchard, 107 N. C. 921, 12 S. E.
5o (i8go) ; Burns v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 61 S. W. (2d) 512 (1933) ; Haynes
v. Hall, 37 Vt. 20 (1864).
11g. United States v. Deaver, 14 Fed. 595 (W. D. N. C. 1882). Statutes some-
times speak in terms of "wilful and malicious oppression" to incorporate the special
mental element. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) c. 30, § 3945; State v. Kruger, 280 Mo. 293,
217 S. W. 310 (1919).
12o. Regina v. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468, 114 Eng. Rep. R. 975 (1843).
121. Rex v. Jackson, i Term. R. 653, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 1302, 1303 (I737).
122. State v. Boyd, 196 Mo. 52, 94 S. W. 536 (19o6), Some statutes seem not to
require this mental element State v. Browne, 4 Idaho 723, 44 Pac. 552 (1896).
123. People v. Jones, 54 Barb. 311 (N. Y. 1863). Defendants are not guilty of this
charge unless they "knowingly and purposely disregarded the statute". Id. at 318.
124. State v. Bair, 71 Ohio St. 410, 73 N. E. 514 (1905).
125. County Canvassing Board v. Lester, 96 Fla. 484, 489, 118 So. 201, 202 (1928).
126. See People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 Pac. 45, 47 (1892) ; Common-
wealth v. Robinson, 305 Pa. 302, 3o8, 157 Atl. 689, 692 (1g3i).
127. Felton v. United States, 96 U. S. 699, 702 (1877).
128. State v. Lazarus, 181 Iowa 625, 634, 164 N. W. 1037, 1040 (1917).
129. See King v. State, 103 Ga. 263, 265, 30 S. E. 30, 31 (1898) ; Smythe v. State,
51 Tex. Cr. R. 408, 415, 103 S. W. 899, 903 (o7) ; Bennett v. State, log Tex. Cr. R.
237, 239, 4 S. W. (2d) 62, 63 (1928). There is this slight variation in the actual quota-
tions in the three cases, in this order: (i) without ground, etc., (2) without reasonable
ground, etc., (3) without reasonable grounds, etc.
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One who cuts timber from the land of another withott proper
authority is liable in a civil action for trespass even if he in good faith
thinks the land is his own; 130 but if a statute has provided a criminal
penalty for one who wilfully commits such a trespass, he is not guilty
of this offense.1 1 And one who has without protest crossed the land
of another by a certain way for fifteen years and continues such prac-
tice after the other attempts repeatedly to close that way, is not guilty
of wilful trespass under the statute if he in good faith believes that his
long use gives him a license to cross there, even if the law of the state
requires a longer period for this purpose.132
In certain other offenses also, the use of the word "wilful" may add
to the crime a special mental element of such a nature that a misunder-
standing of the law may result in a bona fide belief of propriety suffi-
cient to negative criminal guilt. On this ground a voter who cast his
ballot in good faith in the ward in which he ate his meals was held not
guilty of wilfully voting where he was not entitled to vote, although he
should have voted in another ward in which the room where he regu-
larly slept was situated. 133 And one who exercised the functions of an
office beyond the proper limit, but under the bona fide belief that he
was lawfully entitled to do so, was held not guilty of wilful usurpation
of office.'
1 4
One under examination in a federal tribunal may not refuse to an-
swer on account of probable incrimination under state law. This point
was not definitely settled until the first of the Murdock cases was de-
cided.13 5 Prior to this decision one Murdock had refused to give testi-
mony as to deductions claimed in his 1927 and 1928 income tax returns
on the ground that his answers would tend to incriminate him under
state law. After this decision he was indicted for wilfully failing to
supply information for the computation of his tax, the indictment being
based upon his refusal to give the desired testimony. In reversing the
conviction the court pointed out that a failure to do what is required
is not "wilful" if it is due to a bona fide misunderstanding of the
law.3
3 6
I3O. State v. Shelvin-Carpenter Co., 1O2 Minn. 470, 114 N. W. 738 (9o8).
131. Hateley v. State, 118 Ga. 79, 44 S. E. 852 (igo3). The Minnesota case in the
preceding note held that if the trespasser acted under a bona fide claim of right he is
not liable for punitive damages as a wilful trespasser, even if his mistake was one of"
law.
132. State v. Hause, 71 N. C. 518 (1874) ; see Wiggins v. State, IIg Ga. 216, 46
S. E. 86 (igo3).
133. State v. Savre, 129 Iowa 122, 105 N. W. 387 (1905). But see People v.
Becker, 179 Ill. App. 446, 453, 454 (i913).
134. People v. Bates, 79 Hun 584, 29 N. Y. Supy. 894 (Sup. Ct. 1894). The same
result has been reached under a statute which dia not use the word "wilfully". Kreid-
ler v. State, 24 Ohio St. 22 (1873). Contra: Wayman v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush 466
(Ky. 1879).
135. United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (931).
136. United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933).
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Knowingly. The word "knowing" in a criminal statute may add
a mental element to the particular offense which will be negatived by
ignorance or mistake of some other law. It was very properly held,
for example, that one who cast his ballot in good faith and upon ad-
vice of competent counsel was not guilty of the statutory offense of
voting "knowing himself not to be a legal voter" even though the ad-
vice was erroneous.' 3 7 An officer who receives a fee to which he is not
entitled, while acting under the bona fide belief that the fee is legally
due, is not guilty under a statute which provides a penalty for an
officer who shall "knowingly" receive a fee to which he is not en-
titled.' 38 And it is error to instruct that ignorance of the law is no
excuse to a charge of wilfully and knowingly attempting to evade the
payment of income taxes. 3 9
Ignorance or Mistake of What Law
Where an exception to the maxim is recognized because of bona
fide reliance upon (i) a statute thereafter held to be unconstitutional,
(2) a decision subsequently overruled, or (3) erroneous legal advice
by a commission or officer authorized by law to advise the public upon
such a matter, the mistake may be with reference either to the very law
violated or to some other law, as in the Murdock case mentioned above.
The same is true in case of bona fide misinterpretation of an obscure or
ambiguous statute not at the time clarified by judicial decision. If
none of these grounds is present and an exception is claimed solely on
the absence of a required specific intent or other special mental element
because of ignorance or mistake of law, the error must relate to some
law other than that under which the prosecution itself is brought. This
may be tested by reference to the types of cases already mentioned. In
a larceny case it may be shown that a misunderstanding of property
law led to the bona fide belief that the particular chattel belonged to the
defendant and that he had a lawful right to immediate possession
thereof, but not that he never heard of the law of larceny or that he
mistakenly believed that he could take away and appropriate another's
property under the particular circumstances without subjecting himself
to the penalty of that law. 140  In a prosecution for malicious trespass
137. Commonwealth v. Bradford, 9 MetC. 268 (Mass. 1845). But cf. State v.
Boyett, 32 N. C. 336 (1849).
138. Cleaveland v. State, 34 Ala. 254 (1859) ; United States v. Highleyman, 26
Fed. Cas. No. 15,361 (W. D. Mo. 1876).
i39. Hargrove v. United States, 67 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
14o. A customary practice of appropriating property of others without consent is
not a defense to a charge of larceny. Commonwealth v. Doane, i Cush. 5 (1848). As
to embezzlement, see Lewis v. People, 99 Colo. io2, 18, 6o P. (2d) ro8g, 1097 (1936);
Stumberg, Mistake of Law in Texas (1937) 15 TEx. L. REV. 287, 290.
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based upon removing a fence from a certain path, it could be shown
that a mistaken belief with reference to the law of right of way led to
the opinion that the fence should not be there, but not that defendant
did not know there was a penalty for wrongfully tearing down an-
other's fence. In a prosecution for extortion, in a jurisdiction in which
the element of corruptness is recognized as a requirement for guilt, the
officer can show his misunderstanding as to the fees allowed by law,
but not his belief that unauthorized fees could be collected without com-
mitting a crime. And under a charge of voting "knowing himself not
to be a legal voter" the defendant could show his misunderstanding of
the election law, but not his ignorance of the penalty provided for cast-
ing a ballot improperly. In the last case both provisions might appear
in the same statute, but the want of knowledge which is admissible in
evidence is limited to those clauses which determine who is entitled to
vote and where, and does not extend to the penal clause itself.
Good Faith and Reasonable Grounds
A "dishonest pretense" of ignorance or mistake of law will never
be recognized as disproving guilt of crime. 14' Because of this fact, in
all of the exceptional situations in which ignorance or mistake of law
will be recognized for this purpose there is a requirement worded in
such terms as that defendant must have been "acting in good faith" ,1412
or in the "bona fide belief" 143 or "honest belief" 144 that the law was
different from what it really is. In addition to this requirement, which
is present in all of the cases, 145 it is sometimes required that this sincere
belief be based upon reasonable grounds.
If the offense charged is one requiring a specific intent in the true
sense of intention, guilt may be disproved by an honest belief incon-
sistent with such an intent, even if the belief results from a mistake
of law not based upon reasonable grounds.146  In other words a belief
may be very sincere although not very reasonable. Hence one who car-
ries away the chattel of another in the honest belief of a lawful right
to do so is not guilty of larceny, even if the ground for his belief is
141. State v. Carroll, i6o Mo. 368, 60 S. W. lO87 (190). See also Morrissette v.
State, 77 Ala. 71 (1884) ; Bridgeman v. State, 145 Ark. 554, 225 S. W. I (1920).
142. Burns v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 6,5, 61 S. W. (2d) 512, 514 (1933),
143. State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200, 202 (1875). ". . . bona fide believing.
." Johnson v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. R. 326, 330, 218 Pac. 179, 181 (1923).
144. Rand v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 343, 353, I95 S. W. 802, 8o8 (1917).
. if the defendant honestly thought. " Commonwealth v. Brisbois, 281
Mass. 125, 128, 183 N. E. 168, 169 (1932).
145. See the cases cited in the three preceding notes.
146. If property is taken "under an honest, although groundless, claim of right", it
is not larceny. Territory v. Dowdy, 14 Ariz. 145, 147, 124 Pac. 894, 895 (1912). A
study of the other larceny cases cited in this chapter will disclose a total want of any
insistence that the ignorance or mistake of law be reasonable.
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"weak"; 147 and one who appropriates money which he had collected
for another is not guilty of embezzlement "however mistaken . . . or
ill founded his claim of right might in fact be, if he honestly enter-
tained such a belief." 148 The jury is not bound to accept the defend-
ant's statement that he believed he had a lawful right to do as he did,14
9
and the absence of reasonable grounds for the alleged belief may be
considered by them in determining whether he "honestly believed" he
had such a right or is merely resorting to a "pretext". 150
If for guilt of the offense charged there is required some special
mental element other than a specific intent in the true sense of the word,
the question whether a mistake of law not based upon reasonable
grounds could disprove guilt seems to depend upon the peculiarities of
this special element. For example, there are numerous indications in
the cases that ignorance or mistake of law will not disprove the charge
of "wilfully" doing the prohibited deed unless the ignorance or mis-
take was based upon reasonable grounds. 15'
In prosecutions in which ignorance or mistake of law is inter-
posed as a defense on some ground other than to disprove the existence
of some required specific intent or other special mental element the
problem will seldom arise. The receipt of legal advice from a con.-
mission or officer authorized by law to advise the public upon such a
matter is good ground for the citizen to believe the advised course
of action is lawful. And the mere existence of a statute not yet
held unconstitutional or a decision not yet overruled is good ground
for the citizen to believe it is law. Furthermore it should be presumed
that he acted with knowledge of such statute or decision,152 the same
as any other.
On the other hand, if the defense is that the statute was ambigu-
ous or obscure and its meaning had not been settled by judicial deci-
sion at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant may properly
be required to show that he "reasonably believed" it to have the mean-
ing he attributed to it as well as that he did so believe "in good
faith".1'5 3
147. Morningstar v. State, 55 Ala. 148, 149 (1876).
148. Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 21, 29, 37 So. 576, 579 (1904).
149. Commonwealth v. Brisbois, 281 Mass. 125, 183 N. E. 168 (1932).
15o. Morningstar v. State, 55 Ala. 148, 149 (1876).
151. One of the common definitions of "wilful" (where the whole context requires
more than merely intentional conduct) is an evil intent "without reasonable grounds for
believing the act to be lawful". This is found with slight variations in wording, in King
v. State, lO3 Ga. 263, 265, 3o S. E. 30, 31 (1898) ; Smythe v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 4o8,
415, 103 S. W. 899, 03 (9o7) ; Bennett v. State, iO9 Tex. Cr. R. 237, 239, 4 S. W.
(2d) 62, 63 (1928).
152. See State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 523, 126 N. W. 454, 457 (19Io).
153. Burns v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 615, 61 S. W. (2d) 512, 514 (1933).
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IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF FACT
In General
Ignorance or mistake of fact is very often an excuse for what
would otherwise be a crime. A street car conductor, for example, who
forcibly ejects a passenger from the car under the honest and reason-
able (though mistaken) belief that his fare has not been paid, is liable
to the passenger in a civil action but not guilty of criminal assault and
battery.154 Other examples of mistakes of fact sufficient to disprove
a charge of assault and battery, include such cases as that of the rail-
road employee who forcibly removed from the platform one who was
there as a passenger but was believed to be there for an unlawful pur-
pose; 155 the police officer who arrested a person for being intoxicated
on a public street, mistakenly believing him to be drunk; 156 and the
householder who wounded a member of a crowd thought to be making
a felonious assault upon the dwelling at night, although the shots by
members of the crowd were fired, not at the house, but 'only in the
spirit of frolic. 157  In addition there are numerous cases recognizing
mistake of fact as an excuse in prosecutions for other offenses.'15
"Ignorantia facti excusat",159 however, is obviously too sweeping
even for a general statement of law, because it is clear (to mention only
one point for the moment) that if a certain deed would constitute
exactly the same crime under either of two factual situations, it will be
no excuse that one was mistaken for the other.160 Hence some modifica-
-tion is needed, such as that "in some cases ignorantia facti doth ex-
cuse", 161 or "an honest mistake of fact will generally shield one from
a criminal prosecution." 162 To be more specific, it may be stated as a
154. State v. McDonald, 7 Mo. App. 51o (1879).
155. Commonwealth v. Power, 7 Metc. 596 (Mass. 1844).
156. Commonwealth v. Presby, 14 Gray 65 (Mass. i86o).
157. State v. Nash, 88 N. C. 618 (1883).
158. Carrying concealed weapons: Miles v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 561, lo8 S. W.
378 (1908). See also State v. Williams, 184 Iowa 1070, 169 N. W. 371 (ii8). Em-
bezzlement: State v. Smith, 47 La. Ann. 432, 16 So. 938 (895) ; Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 266 Pa. 236, 1O9 Ati. 913 (i2o). Forgery: Scott v. State, 91 Miss. 156, 44
So. 8o3 (19o7) ; Crossland v. State, iii Tex. Cr. R. 357, 12 S. W. (2d) 1O36 (1929) ;
Rex v. Forbes, 7 C, & P. 224, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 99 (1835). Harboring a slave: Birney
v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837). Illegal voting: Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308 (1875).
Larceny: Bird v. State, 48 Fla. 3, 37 So. 525 (1904) ; State v. Barrackmore, 47 Iowa
684 (1878). Malicious trespass: Wagstaff v. Schippel, 27 Kan. 450 (1882). Murder:
Regina v. Rose, 15 Cox C. C. 540 (1884). Unwholesome provisions: State v. Snyder,
44 Mo. App. 429 (1891). Uttering a forged instrument: United States v. Carll, 105
U. S. 611 (1881). Nonwilfull intoxication: State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 39, 16 Pac. 259
(1888).
159. Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio St. 456, 459 (1877).
i6o. Regina v. Lynch, I Cox C. C. 361 (1846).
161. I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42.
162. People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 331, 193 N. E. 15o, 153 (934).
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general rule (subject, however, to exceptions in certain cases 163) that
mistake of fact will disprove a criminal charge if the mistaken belief is
(a) honestly entertained, (b) based upon reasonable grounds and (c)
of such a nature that the conduct would have been lawful had the facts
been as they were reasonably supposed to be. 164
Honest and Reasonable Belief
The term "honest belief", and equivalent phrases, 165 are some-
times used to express two different ideas: (I) that the belief must
have been sincere and (2) that what was done would have been
proper had the facts been as they were mistakenly supposed to be.' 6
It will be more convenient, however, to deal with these matters sepa-
rately, and the second will be reserved for subsequent attention. As
to the first no more need be said than that the possibility of excuse
based upon mistake of fact never has any application "where there is
no honest belief . . . but . . . a dishonest pretense is resorted to in
the endeavor to escape punishment." 167 The mistaken belief must
always be "honest and real" rather than "feigned"; 168 sincere rather
than a mere "pretext". 169
While there is no exception to the requirement that the mistaken
belief of the factual situation must be genuine, the question whether it
must be based upon reasonable grounds is not so simple. Undoubtedly
the second requirement is frequently present, as indicated by the re-
peated occurrence of such phrases as "reasonable grounds",1 70 "well-
grounded",'1' "reasonable ground for believing",' 72 "due care to ascer-
tain",' 7 3 "might reasonably have been expected to induce such a belief
in a man of ordinary firmness and intelligence", 174 "not superinduced
163. In certain cases the statement requires too much, in certain other cases it is
inadequate. See infra.
164. See Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. i68, i9o (I889) ; Marmont v. State, 48
Ind. 21, 3, (1874).
i65. Such as "bona fide belief". Mulreed v. State, 107 Ind. 62, 66, 7 N. E. 884,
887 (1886).
i66. "Ignorance or mistake in fact, guarded by an honest purpose, will afford, at
common law, a sufficient excuse for a supposed criminal act." Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio
St. 456, 459 (877).
167. State v. Carroll, i6o Mo. 368, 371, 6o S. W. io87, io88 (igoo).
I68. Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. I4 r , 144 (1878).
i69. Barton v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 368, 370, 227 S. W. 317, 318 (192).
I7O. Hale v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 8o8, 813, 183 S. E. i8o, 182 (936).
171. State v. Rhone, 223 Iowa 1221, 1233, 275 N. W. io9, ii6 (937).
172. Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 197 (849) ; State v. Nash, 88 N. C. 618, 621
(1883). ". . . reasonable ground to believe. . . ." Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21,
31 (1874).
173. Mulreed v. State, 107 Ind. 62, 66, 7 N. E. 884, 887 (886). ". proper
care to ascertain ....... Welch V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 528, 530, 81 S. W. 50, 51
(i9o4). "He is bound to exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the facts.
Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308, 310 (1875).
174. State v. Cook, 78 S. C. 253, 264, 59 S. E. 862, 866 (1907).
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by fault or negligence", 17 5 or "it must also be such a mistake as does
not arise from a want of proper care". 176
If no specific intent or other special mental element is required for
guilt of the offense charged, a mistake of fact will not be recognized
as an excuse unless it was based upon reasonable grounds.177  One, for
example, who kills another because of a mistaken belief that his own
life is in imminent peril at the hands of the other, is not excused if
there is no reasonable ground for this belief..7  If a specific intent or
other special mental element is required for guilt of the offense charged,
the possibility of excuse due to a mistake of fact not based on reason-
able grounds must be studied in the light of this special requirement and
the mistake itself. The ultimate question in any prosecution is whether
or not all of the essential elements of guilt are established. If any such
element is found to be wanting, guilt has not been substantiated; and
hence if proof of a mistake of fact, even without the support of rea-
sonable grounds, negatives the existence of such an element, it also dis-
proves the charge itself.
This problem is essentially the same as that involved where the
existence of such an element is negatived by proof of a mistake of law.
The distinction is not always clear cut. An erroneous belief of owner-
ship and right to immediate possession of a chattel, for example, may
be due to misapprehension of property law or to mistaken identity of
the thing itself. In another case misunderstanding of law and fact may
combine. But since the result is the same if it is sought to disprove the
existence of some required specific intent or other special mental ele-
ment, it is not essential for the mistake to be classified as belonging to
one type or the other. Because of the requirement of a specific intent
175. Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141, 144 (i878).
176. Stern v. State, 53 Ga. 229 (1874) ; Hamilton v. State, 1i5 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 29
S. W. (2d) 777 (1930).
177. United States v. Thompson, 12 Fed. 245 (D. Ore. 1882) ; Gordon v. State, 52
Ala. 308 (1875) ; Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. i4i (878) ; Stem v. State, 53 Ga. 229
(1874) ; Goetz v. State, 41 Ind. 162 (1872) ; Mulreed v. State, 107 Ind. 62, 7 N. E. 884
(1886); State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Colan-
dro, 231 Pa. 343, 8o Atl. 571 (i911) ; Hamilton v. State, i15 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 29 S. W.
(2d) 777 (0930).
In one case of carrying concealed weapons it was held reversible error to charge
the jury to acquit if they found that defendant "did not know, or could not have I-ea-
sonably known, that the pistol was in his coat." Miles v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 56i,
562, io8 S. W. 378 (i9o8). This is out of line with the decided trend of the cases
unless a distinction is to be drawn between situations in which the defendant intention-
ally does the deed which constitutes the actus reus of the offense (being induced to do
so because of the mistake which is not based upon reasonable grounds) and situations
in which, because of the mistake, the doing of the deed itself was unknown to the de-
fendant.
178. Hill v. State, 194 Ala. ii, 69 So. 941 (i915) ; People v. Williams, 32 Cal. 280
(1867) ; Kyle v. People, 215 Ill. 250, 74 N. E. 146 (io5) ; State v. Towne, i8o Iowa
339, i6o N. W. io (917) ; State v. Allen, iii La. 154, 35 So. 495 (i9o3) ; Loy v.
State, 26 Wyo. 381, i85 Pac. 796 (i919).
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to steal there is no such thing as larceny by negligence. 17 9  One does
not commit this offense by carrying away the chattel of another in the
mistaken belief that it is his own, no matter how great may have been
the fault leading to this belief, if the belief itself is genuine.' s0  And
a conversion of property intrusted is not embezzlement if it was due to
a mistake giving rise to a bona fide belief of authority to appropriate,
whether the "belief was well founded or not".'
A mental element required for guilt of the particular offense, other
than a specific intent in the true sense of the word, may be negatived
by a bona fide belief resulting from an ill-grounded mistake of fact,
depending upon the peculiarity of the required element. Thus an un-
true statement under oath is not wilfully and corruptly false and hence
not perjury if genuinely believed to be true, however great the care-
lessness which induced the belief.'8 2  Because of the similarity of this
problem to that previously discussed in connection with ignorance or
mistake of law, it is not necessary to give further attention to it other
than to speak of the most obvious type of case in which a special
mental element, other than specific intent, may be disproved by evi-
dence of mistake of fact, whether based upon reasonable grounds or
not. This is where the prosecution is for an offense the very definition
of which requires knowledge of some particular matter actually un-
known to the defendant.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that the word
"knowledge", as used at this point in the law, includes not only actual
knowledge, but also guilty belief which corresponds with the fact,
8 3
and even "guilty avoidance of knowledge", as where the fact would
have been known had not the person wilfully "shut his eyes" in order
i79. People v. Watson, 154 Misc. 667, 278 N. Y. Supp. 759 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd,
245 App. Div. 838, 282 N. Y. Supp. 235 (2d Dep't i935).
i8o. Regina v. Halford, ii Cox C. C. 88 (1868) ; People v. Devine, 95 Cal. 227, 30
Pac. 378 (1892) ; Dean v. State, 41 Fla. 291, 26 So. 638 (i899) ; People v. Shaunding,
268 Mich. 218, 255 N. W. 770 (934) ; Stanley v. State, 6i Okla. Cr. R. 382, 69 P.
(2d) 398 (1937).
i8i.. Lewis v. People, 99 Colo. 1o2, 117, 6o P. (2d) io8g, io96 (936). See also
People v. Parker, 355 Ill. 258, 189 N. E. 352 (1934); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 266
Pa. 236, io9 Atl. 913 (1920). In the Parker case the court speaks of "reasonable
grounds", but this seems to have been an inadvertent use of the familiar phrase because
the holding is that guilt is disproved by a bona fide belief of the right to appropriate
certain funds "even if the claim of the defendant was ill-founded or without merit". In
the Wilson case the court reverses a conviction for failure to instruct properly upon the
question of mistake of fact. There is no suggestion of the need for "reasonable
grounds".
182. United States v. Shellmire, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,271 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1831);
People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 52 Pac. 155 (i898) ; Commonwealth v. Brady,
5 Gray 78 (Mass. i855).
183. Regina v. White, i F. & F. 665, 175 Eng. Rep. R. 898 (859) ; State v. Friend,
210 Iowa 98o, 987, 23o N. W. 425, 429 (93o) ; Meath v. State, 174 Wis. 8o, 83, 182
N. W. 334, 335 (1921).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
to avoid knowing..84  It does not include, however, a bona fide belief
contrary to fact, even if not based upon reasonable grounds.'8 5
'One, for example, is not guilty of uttering a forged instrument
with knowledge of the forgery if he actually had no doubt of its genu-
ineness, even if he was quite negligent in not discovering its falsity.'8 6
A charge of receiving stolen goods knowing the same to have been
stolen is not established by proof of the receipt of the goods under
circumstances which should have induced a belief of this fact if the
defendant actually had no such belief.18 7  If the statute on fraudulent
banking requires receipt of a deposit by a banker knowing his bank to
be insolvent at the time, "mere negligence is not enough".. 88  In a
prosecution for obtaining property by false pretenses it is reversible
error to give an instruction which will permit the jury to find the defend-
ant guilty if he was quite careless in making the untrue statement-
because he might in good faith believe the statement to be true in spite
of his fault in not having a correct understanding of the facts. 189 One
who sends non-mailable matter through the mail without suspecting
the presence of the forbidden contents is not guilty of knowingly de-
positing such matter in the mails even if he was negligent in not know-
ing. 190 As said by the California court in reversing a conviction of
procuring false evidence in the form of an affidavit from one who was
to defendant's knowledge incapable of making an affidavit, "facts which
would ordinarily suggest the inquiry are not sufficient. The jury must
believe that they did in fact suggest the inquiry to the defendant." 191
Offenses not Requiring Mens Rea
At common law a public nuisance is in substance a civil wrong,
although included in the general category of "crime" because for the
sake of convenience, it is handled procedurally by the machinery used
for criminal cases..9 2  Since it is not a true crime, but only an "anom-
alous offense", guilt is established by what is done without the normal
184. People v. Cummings, 123 Cal. 269, 55 Pac. 898 (1899) ; State v. Lintner, 141
Kan. 505, 41 P. (2d) 1036 (1935) ; People v. Sugarman, 216 App. Div. 209, 216, 213
N. Y. Supp. 56, 63 (Ist Dep't 1926), aff'd, 243 N. Y. 638, 154 N. E. 637 (1926).
185. United States v. Sheilmire, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,271 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1831);
People v. Von Tiedeman, 12o Cal. 128, 52 Pac. 155 (1898) ; State v. Dunning, 13o Iowa
678, 107 N. W. 927 (19o6); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 266 Pa. 236, lO9 Atl. 913
(1920) ; State v. Pickus, 63 S. D. 209, 257 N. W. 284 (934).
186. Carver v. People, 39 Mich. 786 (1878); Wells v. Territory, I Okla. Cr. R.
469 (I9O8).
187. State v. Alpert, 88 Vt. 191, 92 Atl. 32 (1914) ; Meath v. State, 174 Wis. 8o,182 N. W. 334 (1921).
188. State v. Dunning, 130 Iowa 678, 107 N. W. 927 (i9o6) ; State v. Tomblin, 57
Kan. 841, 48 Pac. 144 (1897) ; State v. Drew, iio Minn. 247, 124 N. W. iogi (191o).
Contra: McClure v. People, 27 Colo. 358, 61 Pac. 612 (1900).
i89. State v. Pickus, 63 S. D. 209, 257 N. W. 284 (934).
i9o. Konda v. United States, 166 Fed. 91 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o8).
191. See People v. Brown, 74 Cal. 3o6, 310, 16 Pac. 1, 3 (1887).
192. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (I5th ed. 1936) 46.
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inens rea requirement. 193 This seems to be the only common law excep-
tion to the rule that criminal guilt requires mens rea. as well as actus
reus.19 4 Furthermore, this mens rea requirement normally applies'to
statutory crimes 195 as well as to common-law offenses, but it is within
the legislative power to provide a penalty for the bare deed alone.19 6
Whether a given statute is to be construed one way or the other "is to
be determined by the court, by considering the subject matter of the
prohibition as well as the language of the statute". 19 7 The nature of
the penalty involved may also be an important factor in this regard,198
although not as a simple rule of thumb. An offense may have the mens
rea requirement even if the only penalty is a fine,199 and may not have
it although punishable by imprisonment,20 0 but the tendency of these
provisions is to tip the scales the other way, and if a particular case is
otherwise in doubt this may be the determining factor. 20 1
There is no moral delinquency without a blameworthy state of
mind, and hence if the purpose of the statute is to prevent conduct
which would generally be regarded as wrong (in the light of the pre-
vailing moral standards of the time in the jurisdiction), the element of
mens rea will'ordinarily be assumed to be included even if not men-
tioned in the enactment. 20 2  Not all statutory offenses, however, are of
this nature. In the exercise of its police power the state may prohibit,
under penalty, conduct which would otherwise be quite proper, such as
parking overtime in a restricted district,20 3 or soliciting insurance on
193. Id. at 45-6.
194. Ibid. Some of the early cases of criminal libel came very close to the same
result, although the theory seems to have been different. Rex v. Gutch, M. & M. 432,
173 Eng. Rep. R. 1214 (1829).
195. Leeman v. State, 35 Ark. 438 (x88o) ; State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 Pac.
259 (888) ; see United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 251 (1922) ; Troutner v. State,
17 Ariz. 5o6, 508, I54 Pac. 1048 (1916) ; Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 30, I89
N. E. 6Ol, 6o5 (1934) ; People v. Rice, x61 Mich. 657, 664, 126 N. W. 981, 984 (ip9o).
I96. Smith v. State, 71 Fla. 639, 71 So. 915 (1916) ; People v. Johnson, 288 Ill.
442, 123 N. E. 543 (1919) ; State v. Dunn, 202 Iowa 1188, 21H N. W. 850 (1927);
State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa 858, 250 N. W. 702 (1933) ; People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich.
86, 71 N. W. 497 (1897) ; State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N. E. 163 (1896) ; State
v. Whitman, 52 S. D. 91, 216 N. W. 858 (1927); McKnight v. State, 171 Tenn. 574,
io6 S. W. (2d) 556 (1937). Also the last four cases cited in note 195 supra.
197. McKnight v. State, 171 Tenn. 574, 577, io6 S. W. (2d) 556, 557 (1937). "It
is a question of legislative intent, to be construed by the court." United States v.
Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 252 (1922).
i98. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Cor. L. REv. 55, 83 (1933).
199. Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837).'
2oo. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922) ; State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa 858,
250 N. W. 702 (933).
201. Compare Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6 (1867) with Stern v. State,
53 Ga. 229 (1874).
202. Adultery: State v. Audette, 81 Vt 400, 70 Atl. 833 (19o8). Bigamy: Regina
v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168 (x88g). Drunk in a public place: State v. Brown, 38 Kan.
390, x6 Pac. 259 (x888). Embezzlement: State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175, 53 Pac. 978
(1898). Extortion: Leeman v. State, 35 Ark. 438 (88o) ; State v. Pritchard, io7 N.
C. 921, 12 S. E. 50 (1890). Contra: Levar v. State, 1O3 Ga. 42, 29 S. E. 467 (1897).
Uttering a forged instrument: Regina v. Page, 8 C. & P. 122, 173 Eng. Rep, R. 425
(1837). In addition see Troutner v. State, 17 Ariz. 5o6, 5o8, 154 Pac. lO48 (1916).
203. Commonwealth v. Ober, 236 Mass. 25, 189 N. E. 6ol (I934).
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behalf of an insurance company which has not complied with certain
statutory requirements. 20 4  The tendency has been to construe such
statutes as providing a penalty for the thing done irrespective of the
state of mind of the doer,20 5 unless the legislature has used language
indicating otherwise.20 6  The development along this line has so far
taken a rather haphazard course,20 7 but it has come to be recognized
that the modern complicated social order finds the need of certain pro-
hibitions which should be classed as "civil offenses" 208 or "public
torts" 209 rather than "true crimes". 210  "In general, offenses not re-
quiring mens rea are the minor violations of laws regulating the sale
of intoxicating liquor, impure or adulterated food, milk, drugs or nar-
cotics, criminal nuisances, violations of traffic or motor-vehicle regula-
tions, or of general police regulations passed for the safety, health, or
well-being of the community and not in general involving moral de-
linquency." 211
Needless to say, the language of the particular statute must be
scrutinized. The absence of such a word as "wilfully" or "knowingly"
in certain sections of a statute has peculiar significance if it has been
used in other portions of the same act.212  Even the legislative history
204. McKnight v. State, 17I Tenn. 574, io6 S. W. (2d) 556 (1937).
205. McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 6oi (1873); People v. Johnson, 288 II1. 442,
123 N. E. 543 (i919); State v. Dunn, 202 Iowa II88, 211 N. W. 85o (1934); Com-
monwealth v. Boynton, 84 Mass. x6o (1861) ; Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489
(Mass. 1864) ; State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N. E. 163 (1896) ; Commonwealth
v. Weiss, 139 Pa. 247, 21 Atl. io (i8gi) ; Commonwealth v. Hendrie, 97 Pa. Super.
328 (1929) ; State v. Whitman, 52 S. D. 91, 216 N. W. 858 (1927) ; State v. Gilmore,
8o Vt. 514, 68 Atl. 658 (19o8) ; Welch v. State, 145 Wis. 86, 129 N. W. 656 (1911).
Where the offense is merely malum prohibiturn ". . . the courts have held, with very
few exceptions, that, where there is nothing in the statute to indicate that scienter is
an element of the offense, the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the defendant is im-
material." State v. Whitman, 52 S. D. 91, 93, 216 N. W. 858, 859 (1927). See also
State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 179, 43 N. E. 163, 164 (1896).
206. Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. People, 85 Ill. App. 301 (1899).
207. The divergence in the actual results of cases in this field is due partly to dif-
ferences in the wording of statutes and partly to the construction placed upon such acts
by the courts. Halsted v. State, 41 N. J. L. 552 (1879). See also the cases there cited.
Compare, for example, the following cases. Permitting minor to play billiards
without consent of his parent or guardian: mens rea required, Stern v. State, 53 Ga.
229 (1874); not required, Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6 (1867). Selling
liquor to a minor: inens rea required, People v. Welch, 71 Mich. 548, 39 N. W. 747
(1888) ; not required, State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 6o (1869). Unlawful possession of
intoxicating liquor: inens rea required, State v. Cox, 91 Ore. 518, 179 Pac. 575 (1919) ;
not required, State v. Whitman, 52 S. D. 9I, 216 N. W. 858 (1927). Sale of adul-
terated milk: miens rea required, Commonwealth v. Flanelly, 15 Gray 195 (Mass.
i86o) ; not required (after a change in statute), Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass.
489 (1864).
208. Legis., Criminal Law-Reclassfication of Certain Offenses as Civil Instead of
Criminal (1937) 12 Wis. L. REV. 365.
209. MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES (4th ed. 1938) § io.
210. Professor Sayre distinguishes between "public welfare offenses" and "true
crimes". Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1938) 33 Co. L. REv. 55, 84.
211. Id. at 83.
212. Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. People, 85 Ill. App. 301 (1899) ; Commonwealth v.
Raymond, 97 Mass. 567 (1867) ; People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich. 86, 71 N. W. 497
(1897).
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of the provision should receive attention, because the reason for the
omission of such a term is made clear if it was originally included and
subsequently stricken out by amendment. 213
Knowledge of the fact which brings the deed within the statutory
ban is not essential to guilt of an offense having no ment rea require-
ment.2 14  Each individual acts "at his peril" 215 in this regard and if he
brings about the prohibited result his ignorance or mistake of fact
will not excuse him.216  This is true even if he has used due diligence
in the effort to ascertain the fact, but has been misled by the fraud
of another.
2 1 7
Instances of conviction under particular statutes, notwithstanding
ignorance or mistake of the essential fact, include such cases as posses-
sion'2 18 sale 219 or transportation 220 of intoxicating liquor; sale of oleo-
margarine, 22 1 or of adulterated food or drugs; 222 sales from short
weights or measures; 223 admitting a minor to a billiard room without
written consent of his parent or guardian; 224 possession of automobile
with engine number altered; 225 subscribing to false statements with
reference to securities; 226 soliciting insurance on behalf of a company
not authorized to do business within the state; 227 parking overtime in
a restricted district; 228 and exceeding the speed limit,22 9 among many
others.
2 30
213. Smith v. State, 223 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270 (ig3i); State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa
858, 250 N. W. 702 (1934).
214. Smith v. State, 223 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270 (1931). " knowledge or lack
of knowledge . . . is immaterial.' State v. Whitman, 52 5. D. 91, 93, 216 N. W.
858, 859 (1927).
215. Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6, 8 (1867); People v. Snowberger, 113
Mich. 86, 92, 71 N. W. 497, 499 (1897) ; State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. i66, I8o, 43 N. E.
163, z64 (1896).
216. State v. Gilmore, 80 Vt. 514, 68 Atl. 658 (19o8).
217. State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 6o (i869).
218. State v. Whitman, 52 S. D. 91, 216 N. W. 858 (1927).
219. Troutner v. State, 17 Ariz. 5o6, 154 Pac. 1O48 (1916); Commonwealth v.
Boynton, 2 Allen i6o (Mass. i86i).
220. Comnionwealth v. Hendrie, 97 Pa. Super. 328 (1929).
221. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 139 Pa. 247, 21 Atl. IO (18qi). Thus a conviction
of serving oleomargarine at a lunch counter was upheld although defendant was a
waiter, in charge of the counter, who supposed the substance to be butter. Welch v.
State, 145 Wis. 86, 129 N. W. 656 (1911).
222. Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489 (Mass. 1864) ; People v. Snowberger,
113 Mich. 86, 71 N. W. 497 (1897) ; State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N. E. 163
(1896).
223. Smith v. State, 223 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270 (93).
224. Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6 (1867).
225. People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 44:; 123 N. E. 543 (1919); State v. Dunn, 202
Iowa ii88, 211 N. W. 85o (1927).
226. State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa 858, 25o N. W. 7o2 (934).
227. McKnight v. State, 171 Tenn. 574, io6 S. W. (2d) 556 (1937).
228. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 30, 189 N. E. 6oi, 6o2 (1934).
229. Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 140, 138 S. W. 399 (1911).
23o. Professor Sayre in his article, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 COL. L.
REV. 55, 84 (Appendix), classifies offenses not requiring Mnens rea (under particular
statutes) into the following groups:
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A statute, it may be added, may include some mental element and
at the same time exclude part of the normal requirement, if the inten-
tion to do so is clearly expressed. For example, a Massachusetts statute
provided a penalty for killing a calf less than four months old with in-
tent to sell its meat for human consumption and also for the selling of
such meat. The latter clause had an additional requirement of knowl-
edge which was omitted from the former. It was held that one who
killed a calf under the specified age with intent to sell the meat for
human consumption was guilty even if he did not know the animal was
so young.
231
Mistake Only as to Extent of Wrong
A misdeed, committed with knowledge of sufficient facts to estab-
lish its criminality, is not necessarily limited to some lower grade of
offense than would otherwise be found merely because the offender was
mistaken as to some fact relating only to the degree of the crime or
the extent of the wrong done. 232  It is submitted, for example, that
the stealing of goods of such value as to constitute grand larceny is
not to be forced into the category of petit larceny merely because the
thief mistakenly thought them worth less than the sum required for
this purpose. And the kidnaper who transports his victim from one
state to another is guilty of a federal offense although mistaken as to
the location of the boundary line and unaware of crossing it.233  Some
types of offense require a different answer, as where the more serious
crime requires a specific intent which is lacking because of the mistake
of fact.
234
i. Illegal sales of intoxicating liquor
(a) Sales of prohibited beverage
(b) Sales to minors
(c) Sales to habitual drunkards
(d) Sales to Indians
(e) Sales by methods prohibited by law
2. Sales of impure or adulterated food
(a) Sales of adulterated or impure milk
(b) Sales of adulterated butter or oleomargarine
3. Sales of misbranded articles
4. Violations of anti-narcotic acts
5. Criminal nuisances
(a) Annoyances or injuries to the public health, repose or comfort
(b) Obstructions of highways
6. Violations of traffic regulations
7. Violations of motor-vehicle laws
8. Violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or
well-being of the community.
231. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 567 (1867).
232. In the following cases, for example, it is emphasized that the known facts
alone constituted an offense (although less serious than the one charged). Brown v.
State, 7 Penne. I59, 74 Atl. 836 (Del. igog) ; Commonwealth v. Murphy, I65 Mass. 66,
42 N. E. 504 (895).
233. United States v. Powell, 24 F. Supp. i6o (E. D. Tenn. 1938).
234. If one should unlawfully make a thrust at another intending only to poke him
with what he supposed was an ordinary cane, he would not be guilty of an assault with
intent to murder, even if this is found to be a deadly instrument disguised as a cane.
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In certain very extreme situations one may be convicted of a true
crime although at the time of his deed he was laboring under a mistake
of fact based upon reasonable grounds, and of such a nature that the
thing done would not have been a crime had the facts been as he rea-
sonably supposed them to be. These are cases in which the deed would
have involved a high degree of moral delinquency even under the sup-
posed facts, and the claim for acquittal is based, not upon the ground
that defendant thought his deed was proper or lawful but only that he
thought it was a type of wrongful conduct for which no criminal
penalty had been provided.233 The common examples fall within the
fields of statutory rape, abduction and adultery.
A man who has illicit sexual intercourse with a girl under the age
of consent is guilty of statutory rape although she consented and he
mistakenly believed she was older than the limit thus established.23 6
This is true no matter how reasonable his mistaken belief may have
been, 237 as in cases in which both her appearance and her positive state-
ment indicated she was older than she was in fact,238 or in which he
had exercised considerable pains in the effort to ascertain her age.
239
One who has illicit intercourse with a. married person is guilty of adul-
tery even if he has no idea that the other is married.240  Violation of
the abduction statute by taking a girl under a certain age from the
possession of her parent or guardian without the consent of such par-
ent or guardian and for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage,
will support a conviction notwithstanding a reasonable mistake as to
the age of the girl.24 - And if a statute prohibits harboring a prosti-
tuteunder a certain age, a mistake on this point is no defense.242
Even without the requirement of a specific intent, the thing done may be such a
wholly unexpected addition to the thing intended as to permit the excuse of mistake of
fact, if the thing intended did not involve too great a degree of moral delinquency.
Thus one charged with the statutory offense of assaulting a peace officer while in the
lawful discharge of his duties must be convicted of simple assault only if he did not
know and had not been informed that the person was an officer. Baker v. State, 53 Tex.
Cr. R. 14, ioS S. W. 665 (I9O8).
235. See State v. Houx, lO9 Mo. 654, 661, 19 S. W. 35, 37 (1891). ". . . . the
act of abduction of which the prisoner was guilty, being a morally wrong act, afforded
abundant proof of his criminal mind." Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. i68, I94 (1889).
236. People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896) ; Heath v. State, 173 Ind.
296, 9o N. E. 310 (igog); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N. E. 5o4
(i895). Assault with intent to commit rape on a girl under the age of consent: State
v. Newton, 44 Iowa 45 (1876).
237. State v. Houx, lO9 Mo. 654, 19 S. W. 35 (i891).
238. People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 1I, 130 N. Y. Supp. 524 (ist Dep't 1911).
239. Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 3o2, 65 S. W. 920 (19O).
24o. State v. Anderson, 140 Iowa 445, 118 N. W. 772 (19o8); Commonwealth v.,
Elwell, 43 Mass. 19o (i84O).
241. People v. Dolan, 96 Cal. 315, 31 Pac. 107 (1892) ; State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447
(x859) ; State v. Johnson, 11S Mo. 480, 22 S. W. 463 (1893). Under express provision
of a few statutes a reasonable belief that the girl is over the age limit is a defense.
Regina v. Packer, 16 Cox C. C. 57 (1886) ; Hermann v, State, 73 Wis. 248, 41 N. W.
r71 (i888).
242. Brown v. State, 7 Penne. I59, 74 Ati. 836 (Del. 1gog).
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It has sometimes been suggested that the reason for this result
in such cases is that these are crimes which have no mens rea require-
ment.243  This is quite unsound and should be avoided because it will
lead to very unsatisfactory results in certain cases, such as those of
insanity, compulsion, and innocent mistake of fact. The latter prob-
lem has arisen most frequently in the adultery cases. If the inter-
course is obviously illicit, the mistaken belief in the unmarried status
of the other party is not an innocent mistake, however.well grounded
it may be since the conduct falls far below the line of social acceptability
even under the supposed facts.2 44  "In such a case there is a measure
of wrong in the act as the defendant understands it, and his ignorance
of the fact that makes it a greater wrong will not relieve him from the
legal penalty." 245 On the other hand, in spite of some indication to
the contrary,2 46 it is clearly established that if the intercourse follows
a marriage ceremony entered into in good faith, with no thought or rea-
son to believe that the other party is already married, it does not con-
stitute the crime of adultery 247 if it does not occur after the mistake
has been discovered.
243
An innocent mistake of fact is possible even in a prosecution for
statutory rape, although it will be much more rare in such a case than
in prosecutions for adultery. The minimum age for a valid marriage
may be substantially lower than the "age of consent" provided for statu-
tory rape.249  The latter is concerned only with illicit intercourse and
hence a husband does not commit rape by having intercourse with his
lawful wife even if she is below the age established for this other
243. See MAY, THE LAW OF ClIMES (4th ed. 1938) 62, n. 117.
244. See State v. Audette, 8I Vt. 400, 403, 7o Atl. 833, 834 (i9o8).
245. Ibid. See quotation from Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168, 194 (1889), cited
supra note 235.
246. The case commonly cited for this position is Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93
Mass. 23 (1865). The syllabus is quite sweeping but the actual holding is that the
statutory presumption of death from seven years' absence cannot be applied where the
so-called "absence" was by the one who was left behind and who remained ever
since in the same general vicinity. The defendant was the one not previously married,
but there was no evidence that he was unaware of the facts relied upon by the woman
for her assertion that she was a widow.
Cases holding that a mistake of law will not excuse in such a prosecution must be
distinguished. Owens v. State, 94 Ala. 97, io So. 669 (1841) ; State v. Goodenow, 65
Me. 30 (1876) ; State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 179 Atl. I (1935). As to this problem
see the discussion under Bigamy, infra p. 65.
It is also necessary to distinguish cases holding merely that it is unnecessary for
the state to allege and prove such knowledge on the part of the defendant, such as Fox
v. State, 3 Tex. App. 329 (1877). This means only that it is incumbent upon the de-
fendant to establish the want of such knowledge. State v. Cody, iii N. C. 725, 16 S. E.
408 (1892).
247. Vaughard v. State, 83 Ala. 55, 3 So. 530 (1887) ; Banks v. State, 96 Ala. 78,
II So. 404 (189I) ; State v. Cutshall, io9 N. C. 764, 14 S. E. 107 (1891) ; State v.
Audette, 8I Vt. 400, 70 Atl. 833 (19o8).
248. Hildreth v. State, ig Tex. Cr. R. i95 (885).
249. Compare CODE OF IOWA (935) § 1048, with id. § 12966.
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purpose. 250 If a man should have intercourse with one of such age,
honestly and reasonably believed by him to be his wife, although legally
she was not because of her prior secret marriage to another, he would
be entirely blameless. Even a mistake as to the identity of the person
with whom the connection is had could be innocent in an extreme situa-
tion. "In such a case there is no offense, for none was intended either
in law or morals." 251
Mens rea is requisite to guilt of such offenses but there is no
specific requirement of knowledge. Hence a prinma facie case of guilt is
established by proof of the act of intercourse by the defendant with one
under the age of consent, or married to another, without either aver-
ment or proof of any such knowledge on his part.2 52 After this prima
fade case is established it is possible for the defendant to come forward
with proof indicating that although he intentionally indulged in the act
of intercourse he did not do so with mens rea, because of a mistake of
fact.253 Whether the proof offered will be sufficient for this purpose
depends not only upon whether the mistake was based upon reasonable
grounds but also upon the nature of the mistake. And the act under
such circumstances as supposed by him may have involved too much
of blameworthiness to permit this excuse, even if he could have avoided
any criminal penalty had his conjecture been correct.
III
BIGAMY
Problems of ignorance and mistake have presented unusual diffi-
culties in connection with the crime of bigamy, and on some of the
points involved the present state of the authorities is far from satisfac-
tory. Difficulty is encountered even in the choice of words to be used
in discussing the matter because a marriage ceremony in due form
will not create the marital 'relation if either party has another spouse
at the time. Such a ceremony is not in the true legal sense a marriage,
nor is either party the lawful husband or wife of the other. Yet it is
common to speak of a "bigamous marriage" and to define bigamy as
the "offense of having a plurality of wives or husbands at the same
time".
254
Quite obviously one charged with bigamy will not be excused be-
cause of ignorance of the statute prohibiting a second marriage by one
250. Plunkett v. State, 72 Ark. 409, 82 S. W. 845 (1904) ; People v. Pizzura, 211
Mich. 71, 178 N. W. 235 (i92o) ; State v. Rollins, 8o Minn. 216, 83 N. W. 141 (I9OO).
251. State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447, 450 (i859).
252. Fox v. State, 3 Tex. Cr. R. 329 (1877).
253. State v. Cody, iii N. C. 725, 16 S. E. 4o8 (1892).
254. See, e. g., GA. CODE (1933) §26-560i; MAy's C.IINAI. LAw (4th ed. by
Sears and Weihofen, 1938) § 138.
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who has a lawful spouse living at the time,2 55 or because of a mistaken
belief as to the impropriety and invalidity of such an enactment.
2 56
The claim of ignorance or mistake of law in a bigamy case, however,
almost invariably arises from some other angle. Thus a misconception
of the marriage law may induce a bona fide belief of singleness based
upon a false assumption of invalidity of a former marriage. Not even
such a mistake of law is an excuse in a bigamy case, 257 in the absence
of some unusual provision in the statute.258 Hence one who has con-
tracted a common-law marriage commits bigamy by marrying another
woman while the first relation continues, even if he believes the first
marriage invalid because it was not solemnized by the customary cere-
mony performed by clergyman or justice. 2 "O And even reliance upon
the advice of counsel that a former marriage with a cousin is void will
not be an excuse for a second marriage with another.
2 60
A mistaken belief of singleness by a married person may be due
to the erroneous notion that the marriage tie has been dissolved by
divorce, and this type of mistake may be either one of fact or one of
law. If such a claim is made by one who knows just what steps were
taken to obtain a divorce his mistake is one of law, if such steps were
not sufficient to constitute a legal dissolution of the bonds of matrimony,
and will not save him from conviction of bigamy if he marries an-
other.261 On the other hand, if reliance is placed upon incorrect infor-
mation to the effect that a divorce has been obtained by the spouse, the
mistake is one of fact. In a bigamy case it is clear that the state is
not required to allege and prove knowledge of the lack of divorce.
262
The burden is on the defendant to establish his bona fide belief that
his marriage had been dissolved by divorce,2 63 and reasonable grounds
to support such belief.26 4 If his second marriage was contracted by him
while entertaining a bona fide and reasonable belief of this nature, re-
sulting from mistake of fact, he is entitled to an acquittal 265 unless
255. Eldridge v. State, 126 Ala. 63, 28 So. 58o (1899).
256. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. i45 (1878) ; Long v. State, 192 Ind. 524,
137 N. E. 49 (1922).
257. People v. Hartman, 130 Cal. 487, 62 Pat. 823 (igoo) ; State v. Hughes, 58
Iowa I65, II N. W. 7o6 (3882) ; State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802 (1896).
258. The Georgia statute includes the word "knowingly". GA. CoDE (1933) § 26-
560I. Quaere as to the interpretation.
259. State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802 (1896).
260. Staley v. State, 89 Neb. 701, 131 N. W. 3028 (i91i).
261. State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878) ; see Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134
Md. 453, 458, 307 Atl. i85, 187 (9ig) ; cf. State v. Stank, 9 Ohio Dec. 8 (3883).
262. People v. Priestley, 17 Cal. App. i73, 1i8 Pac. 965 (i9ii).
263. State v. Cain, io6 La. 708, 31 So. 300 (1902).
264. Ibid.; Lesueur v. State, 176 Ind. 448, 95 N. E. 239 (i9ii). A mere rumor of
death is insufficient basis for such belief. White v. State, 157 Tenn. 446, 9 S. W. (2d)
702 (928).
265. Bigamy is regarded as extremely anti-social and is severely punished. Hence
the mens rea requirement will be present unless excluded by the language of the statute.
Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168 (1889).
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something in the statute requires a different result. Some courts have
held that innocence may be established by a proper showing of this
nature 268 while others have reached the opposite conclusion. 267  Some
of the cases can be distinguished by differences in the wording of the
various statutes 268 but more frequently there has been a disagreement
as to construction. This can be considered to best advantage in con-
nection with the problem which follows.
Still another type of mistake may lead to a married person's be-
lieving he is single. This is the erroneous belief that his spouse is dead,
and is purely a mistake of fact. The general problem is similar to the
mistake of fact that a divorce has been granted. Like such a mistake
it will not excuse if not based upon reasonable grounds, 2 9 but a bona
fide and well grounded belief that the other spouse is dead should en-
title the defendant to an acquittal in a bigamy case unless the language
of the statute precludes this defense.2 70  Some interpretations have
admitted this defense 271 and others have not.
2 72
Since it is within the power of the legislature in enacting the stat-
ute to include either more or less than the normal mnen rea require-
ment, or to exclude this element entirely, it is necessary to consider each
case in the light of the words used in that jurisdiction. Limitations
of space permit only a very general comment on this subject here. The
statutes differ from the extreme of stipulating "knowingly" as a special
mental element of the offense 273 to provisions which go rather far in
the other direction.2 7 4 For the most part they provide two exceptions
which are, in substance, (i) statutory presumption of death and (2)
266. Robinson v. State, 6 Ga. App. 696, 65 S. E. 792 (909) ; Squire v. State, 46
Ind. 459 (1874) ; Lesueur v. State, 176 Ind. 448, 95 N. E. 239 (1911) ; State v. Spara-
cino, x64 La. 703, 114 So. 6oI (i927) ; Baker v. State, 86 Neb. 775, 126 N. W. 3oo
(i9io) ; State v. Stank, 9 Ohio Dec. 8 (1883) ; Chapman v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 59i,
179 S. W. 570 (i915); Adams v. State, no Tex. Cr. R. 20, 7 S. W. (2d) 528 (1928).
267. Rex v. Wheat, [ig2T] 2 K. B. ug; Russell v. State, 66 Ark. I85, 49 S. W.
821 (1899) ; Ellison v. State, ioo Fla. 736, 129 So. 887 (I93O) ; People v. Spoor, 235
Ill. 230, 85 N. E. 207 (i9o8) ; Rogers v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 19, 68 S. W.
14 (1902); State v. Trainer, 232 Mo. 240, 134 S. W. 528 (igIO) ; State v. Hendrick-
son, 67 Utah 15, 245 Pac. 375 (1926).
268. For example, compare Robinson v. State, 6 Ga. App. 696, 65 S. E. 792 (I9O9)
with State v. Trainer, 232 Mo. 24o, 134 S. W. 528 (Igio).
269. Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141 (1878).
27o. See a comparison of the bigamy statute and the adultery statute in State v.
Audette, 8i Vt. 400, 70 At. 833 (1908).
271. Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. i68 (i889); Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141
(1878) ; Welch v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 528, 8I S. W. 50 (1904).
272. Rand v. State, 129 Ala. 119, 29 So. 844 (19oo) ; Cornett v. Commonwealth,
134 Ky. 613, 121 S. W. 424 (igog) ; Commonwealth v. Hayden, 163 Mass. 453, 4o N. E.
846 (i895) ; State v. Goulden, 134 N. C. 743, 47 S. E. 450 (io4) ; State v. Ackerly,
79 Vt. 69, 64 Atl. 450 (19o6).
273. GA. CODE (1933) § 26-560i. See also id. § 26-5602. Compare Robinson v.
State, 6 Ga. App. 693, 65 S. E. 792 (igog) with Parnell v. State, 126 Ga. io3, 54 S. E.
804 (i9o6).
274. KAN. GEN. ST.%T. ANN. (1935) §§ 21-901, 21-902.
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dissolution of the bonds of matrimony by judicial decree. The issue
is whether the inclusion of these two exceptions impliedly excludes
others not mentioned. The solution requires a careful examination
of the purpose of these clauses.
Where one has left his home and not been heard from afterwards,
an inference of death might arise in a relatively short time under some
circumstances, whereas many years of absence and lack of informa-
tion would fail to support such an inference if it was an obvious case
of desertion by one who wished never to see his deserted spouse again.
It would be so unwise to leave this matter unregulated that the statutes
very generally provide for a statutory presumption of death in the
event of absence for a certain period (varying from two 275 to
seven 276 years) during which the absent one is not known to be alive
by the other spouse.277  It is peculiarly important also for a bigamy
statute to take a position on the matter of divorce because the state
might (i) prohibit a divorcee from marrying any other person during
the life of the original spouse, (2) distinguish between the innocent
party and the guilty party in the divorce proceeding with reference to
the right to remarry, 278 or (3) permit either party to remarry after
the divorce has become effective. Hence a clause on this subject is
commonly included.
2 7 9
In other words, these are two exceptions which have nothing to
do with ordinary crimes but are peculiarly important to bigamy. Be-
cause of this fact it seems out of line with sound principles of
statutory construction to hold that the inclusion of these special and
unusual defenses results in an implied exclusion of all 'general defenses,
such as, for example, compulsion, insanity or mistake of fact. More-
over, had the cases which originally tested the issue been "shotgun
marriages" enforced under the threat of immediate death, and mar-
riages of insane persons, there would probably be no support for the
view that bigamy is an offense with no requirement of mens rea. In
275. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. I8, § 611. This statute requires a "false
rumor, in appearance well founded" in addition to the two years' absence. Some stat-
utes have a three year period without this additional requirement. See, for example,
FLA. Comi'. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1927) § 7560; N. H. Laws (1926) C. 386, § 6.
276. See, e. g., ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 135, § 4; MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 796.
277. See, e. g., ComP. LAWS OF ALASKA (1933) § 4924; CAL. PEN. CODE (1937)
§282; FLA. Comp. GE. LAWS (1927) § 7560; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 17-1803;
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 272, § 15; TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1936) art. 491. Ab-
sence from the United States may be added as a separate clause. See, e. g., ARK. DIO.
STAT. (937) § 3294.
278. Massachusetts, for example, makes such a distinction. MAsS. GEN. LAws
(1932) c. 272, § 15.
279. See the statutes cited supra note 277. The statute may also mention annul-
ment and perhaps add a special clause on annulment because of nonage, thus making
three clauses on the subject of judicial decree. ARK. DIG. STAT. (1937) § 3294.
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fact, there seems to be no case, and probably will be none, excluding
the possibility of such defenses in a prosecution for bigamy.28s The
much narrower issue presented by the decided cases is (i) whether
the statutory mention of absence and want of information for a certain
period excludes bona fide belief of death based upon other reasonable
grounds and (2) whether the reference to (actual) divorce excludes
a reasonable mistake of fact that a divorce has been granted.
The most careful analysis is to be found in Regina v. Tolson 281
which is the leading case for the view that the defenses mentioned in
the statute do not necessarily exclude others of a more general nature.
It is there pointed out that other evidence may indicate death much
more convincingly than mere absence and want of information, and
that it would be absurd to punish a wife for acting in bona fide reliance
upon evidence strong enough to collect a policy of insurance or to
probate a will-as where her second marriage is after she had watched
the burial of a body, disfigured beyond recognition by an explosion,
but confidently believed by her and by others in the community to be
that of her first husband.
28 2
What has come to be regarded as the leading case for the opposite
view is Commonwealth v. Mash,283 in which the actual decision of
guilt was unavoidable because the only basis for the belief of the hus-
band's death was absence and want of information for substantially
less than the statutory period. Language in this opinion quite beyond
the needs of the decision has been relied upon by those courts which
have regarded the inclusion of these special defenses as excluding any
defense based upon the bona fide and reasonable belief of divorce or
of death (unless supported by absence for the statutory period). The
same court, it should be added, may interpret the statute as excluding
one of these defenses but not the other.
28 4
The wish to insure against the harsh interpretation reached by
some of the courts has no doubt been responsible for the inclusion of
certain special provisions in the bigamy statutes, such as the word
"'knowingly", 2 85 or an additional exception where the belief that the
280. Perhaps when cases have forced a more exhaustive analysis of the general
problem it will be found there are no offenses without any requirement of inens rea,
and that offenses now so classified merely have a narrower inens t-ea requirement than
usual, which precludes certain defenses such as mistake of fact and misadventure.
281. 23 Q. B. D. S68 (1889).
282. Id. at 191.
283. 7 Metc. 472 (Mass. 1844).
284. See, for example, Rex v. Wheat, [1921] 2 K. B. 119, which refused to recog-
nize a bona fide and reasonable belief of divorce as a defense and distinguished Regina
v. Tolson, in which the belief was of death. There is more reason for this distinction
if the legislature in attempting to correct the situation gives as an additional excuse
"good reason to believe such husband or wife to be dead" and fails to make similar
provision for belief of divorce. See infra p. 70.
285. GA. CODE (1933) § 26-5601. Or "knowing", COLO. A,. STAT. (1935) c. 48,
§ 201; NEV. Com1'. LAWS (Hillyer, 'I929) § l138.
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husband or wife is dead is based upon good grounds other than mere
absence and want of information. 86  The latter amendment takes
care of one difficulty but tends to add strength to the argument against
recognizing reasonable belief of divorce as an excuse. 28  Assertions
that bona fide belief resulting from reasonable mistake of fact is not a
defense to bigamy in this country,28s or is not a defense here according
to the weight of authority, 28 9 seem not well grounded, 290 but the
problem is in urgent need of careful attention by courts and by legis-
lative bodies.
286. DEL. REV. CODE (935) § 5255; IOWA CODE (1935) § 12976; MICH. CouP.
LAWS (1929) § 16821; N. H. Laws (1926) c. 386, § 6; TENN. CODE (Will. Shan. and
Harlow, 1932) § IlISI; VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) § 4539.
287. White v. State, 157 Tenn. 446, 9 S. W. (2d) 702 (1928).
288. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (i5th ed. 1936) 363.
289. CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (3d ed.) 86, n. 147.
290. Kenny cites no authorities. Clark and Marshall cite for the "prevailing
view" cases from Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, North Carolina, and Vermont. Ibid. To which might be added the cases cited
supra note 267 from Florida, Missouri and Utah. But State v. Armington, 25 Minn.
29 (878), should be omitted because that involved a mistake of law. They cite for the
other view, cases from Indi,- NTebraska, Ohio and Texas. They do not mention the
Louisiana case cited supra note 266, nor statutory provisions cited supra notes 285, 286,
from Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ten-
nessee and Virginia.
